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ABSTRACT 
The idea that our body plays an important role in visual perception has a long history in 
storytelling and philosophy. Some ideas are very intuitive. For example, few will disagree with 
the notion that smaller people perceive the world to be bigger, and vice versa, that larger people 
perceive the world to be smaller. In contrast, more controversial ideas regarding the role of 
our body in visual perception have been debated by philosophers. According to these 
philosophers, the very nature of visual perception lies in the fact that we have a body that 
moves in space. Since George Berkeley (1685 – 1753) first formalized such a fundamental role 
for our body in visual perception, different philosophical theories have branched out to 
account for the latest scientific findings.  
Although experimental psychologists and neuroscientists have long neglected these 
intriguing philosophical accounts, the recent development of body-ownership illusions 
allowed for a more rigorous investigation of the supposed link between our body and visual 
perception. In body-ownership illusions, research participants experience an artificial body (or 
body-part) to be their own. These illusions allow for the dissociation between the subjective 
experience that your body belongs to you (i.e. body-ownership) and the mere visual 
impression of your body from a first-person perspective. The studies that comprise this thesis 
use different ownership illusions to investigate the role of body-ownership in visual perception, 
and the role of visual perception in body-ownership, with visual perception being an 
umbrella-term for both visuospatial perception and visual awareness.  
In Study I and Study II we investigated the mechanisms by which body-size influences the 
perceived size of the world, by having participants experience ownership of different sized 
(and sometimes invisible) bodies. Our results show that this own-body-size effect does not rely 
on visual information per se, but instead, on the recalibration between visual and tactile 
information that updates the representation of external space. In Study III we combine the 
rubber hand illusion with binocular rivalry to show that body-ownership promotes visual 
awareness of a fake hand. And in Study IV we combine the rubber hand illusion with 
continuous flash suppression to show that ownership can be induced in the absence of visual 
awareness. Such unconscious ownership calls for a reevaluation of the standard definition of 
body-ownership. Taken together, these studies illuminate the intricate relationship between 
body-ownership and visual perception. In addition to the scientific research fields of 
visuospatial perception, visual awareness, and body-ownership, these results are valuable to 
the philosophical debate on the nature of visual perception and might provide future 
applications in clinical psychology.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Have you ever visited the house you grew up in as a child? Or maybe been back to your 
old primary school? Or perhaps you found an old toy that you used to play with? If you did, 
you were probably surprised to see that your old bedroom appeared rather small, your old 
classroom was not as spacious as you remember, and your dusty teddy bear is not as big as 
you thought it was. These examples suggest that the world appears larger to a child. One 
possible explanation for this phenomenon is that we perceive the size of the world relatively to 
the size of our body. Poincarré (1897) illustrates this idea very clearly: 
“Suppose that in one night all the dimensions of the universe became a thousand times larger. The world 
will remain similar to itself, if we give the word similitude the meaning it has in the third book of Euclid. Only, 
what was formerly a meter long will now measure a kilometer, and what was a millimeter long will become a 
meter. The bed in which I went to sleep and my body itself will have grown in the same proportion. When I 
awake in the morning what will be my feeling in face of such an astonishing transformation? Well, I shall not 
notice anything at all.”   
This thought experiment highlights how intuitive it is that our body is used as a 
‘fundamental ruler’ in visual perception. It seems to be common knowledge, and has been 
utilized by some renowned literary works, such as Alice in Wonderland and Gulliver’s 
Travels, which could each be viewed as visual perception thought experiments in their own 
right. Extending beyond common knowledge are the more radical claims about the relation 
between our body and visual perception that have been made by several philosophers, as shall 
be discussed in detail in section 1.2. Briefly, these philosophers argue that the very nature of 
visual perception is based on owning a body that moves around in space. Or to put it more 
boldly, that visual perception as we know it, is not possible without owning a body. Intuitive 
and radical ideas alike, the interaction between owning a body and visual perception has 
largely been neglected by experimental psychologists, mainly because it has been difficult to 
investigate it in a controlled laboratory setting. However, recent developments in body 
perception research have changed this, and allow for a rigorous examination of the 
importance of our body in visual perception, and thereby, provide an opportunity for testing 
some of these intuitive ideas and radical claims. 
 
1.1 BODY-OWNERSHIP 
When you look down at your body, you immediately recognize it as your own. And not 
only do you recognize it, as if you would recognize a long-lost friend or your newly bought 
car, it also feels like your body. The term body-ownership refers to that very sensation that 
your body belongs to you (Gallagher, 2000). Patients with damage to their parietal and frontal 
lobes sometimes lose this sensation for a specific limb (Arzy, Overney, Landis, & Blanke, 
2006; Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, & Vallar, 2002). This clinical condition, known as 
asomatognosia, shows that body-
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it can fail to arise if that brain activity is disturbed. Importantly, some of these patients can still 
feel touch, which indicates that their loss of body-ownership is not due to a lack of 
somatosensory processing itself. However, apart from showing that body-ownership is a brain 
function, these clinical observations tell us little about the general principles and perceptual 
mechanisms of body-ownership.  
1.1.1 Rubber hand illusion 
The study of body-ownership accelerated at the end of the 20th century when Botvinick 
and Cohen reported an illusion in which body-ownership could be transferred to an 
inanimate object: the rubber hand illusion (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) (Figure 1A). In the 
rubber hand illusion, the right hand of a research participant lies on a table but is occluded 
from sight. A rubber right hand is placed parallel and medial to the participant’s veridical 
right hand, and is fully visible. The participant observes the rubber hand while the 
experimenter uses two small brushes to touch the participant’s veridical hand and the rubber 
hand at the same time (i.e. synchronous), and at corresponding locations with equal speed 
and direction (i.e. spatially congruent). Within a minute, the majority of participants will 
report a sense of ownership for the rubber hand.  
 
The most straightforward way to measure ownership is to directly ask the participant. 
Botvinick and Cohen used a questionnaire that contains illusion statements to capture illusory 
ownership of the rubber hand (e.g. “The rubber hand felt like my own hand”) as well as 
control statements to capture expectancy effects and task compliance (e.g. “It felt as if I had 
more than one right hand at the same time”), for which participants indicate how much they 
agree or disagree on a seven-point Likert scale. Most studies that investigate body-ownership 
use such a subjective report as a measure for body-ownership, and the original statements 
from Botvinick and Cohen are often re-used, or adapted to fit a particular experiment 
Figure 1. The rubber hand illusion (A) and the full-body illusion 
(B), adapted from Kilteni et al. (2015). © Konstantina Kilteni 
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(Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; van der Hoort, Guterstam, & Ehrsson, 
2011). In addition to subjective reporting on a standardized questionnaire, two objective 
measures are often used to quantify the strength of the rubber hand illusion. After the rubber 
hand illusion is induced, and participants are asked to close their eyes and point towards the 
perceived location of their veridical hand, they point somewhere in between their real hand 
and the rubber hand. This phenomenon was described by Botvinick and Cohen and is 
known as proprioceptive drift. A second objective measure of body-ownership that is widely 
used is the skin conductance response (SCR) to a threat with a sharp object (e.g., Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; van der Hoort et al., 2011). After the 
ownership illusion is induced, the experimenter for example threatens to stab the rubber hand 
with a knife. Because the participant experiences ownership of that hand, this causes an 
autonomous fear response. Among other things, it entails increased diaphoresis, which can be 
measured because sweaty skin conducts electricity better than dry skin. The skin conductance 
response can be seen as the most objective measure of body-ownership because it occurs 
completely outside of awareness, and involves no active contribution from the participant. To 
be clear, participants are completely aware that the rubber hand is not really their hand, it is 
an illusion and not a delusion. Despite this knowledge, proprioceptive drift and the threat-
induced SCR are surprisingly robust effects. 
With their publication of the rubber hand illusion, Botvinick and Cohen (1998) provided 
an experimental tool for experimental psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists to study 
body-ownership in healthy research participants. The rubber hand illusion showed that body-
ownership can be transferred to an inanimate object, and must therefore be the result of a 
dynamic process, which continuously deals with new information. It triggered questions such 
as: What are the limits of the rubber hand illusion, and what are its requirements? And what 
do these limits and requirements tell us about the mechanisms behind body-ownership? Most 
behavioral experiments on the rubber hand illusion apply manual tactile stimulation to both 
the participants’ hand and the rubber hand, and therefore minor temporal mismatches may 
occur. As long as these mismatches are small enough, ownership will still be induced. 
However, when touches are deliberately mismatched, the rubber hand illusion is broken. In 
fact, asynchronously touching the two hands is a standard control condition precisely because 
it abolishes ownership. After a minute of asynchronous touches, participants do not 
subjectively report ownership, they display smaller proprioceptive drift towards the rubber 
hand, and they have weaker SCRs when the rubber hand is threatened (Armel & 
Ramachandran, 2003; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, 2009; Shimada, Fukuda, & 
Hiraki, 2009; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Thus, there seems to be a certain time window in 
which the two hands need to be touched: the temporal rule. The duration of this time-window 
has been investigated by increments of 100 ms, and the maximum delay that still leads to 
significant subjective report and proprioceptive drift was found to be 300 ms (Shimada et al., 
2009). The second rule of the rubber hand illusion is its spatial rule. Touching the index finger 
of the participant while touching the middle finger of the rubber hand does not induce 
ownership. The touches need to be spatially congruent (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Gentile, 
Guterstam, Brozzoli, & Ehrsson, 2013). This also means that the direction and speed of the 
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touches need to match. A third rule is the perspective rule. The rubber hand needs to be placed 
parallel to the participant’s real hand. Rotating the rubber hand disrupts the illusion. And 
again, as for asynchronous stimulation, rotating the hand is often used to deliberately disrupt 
ownership of the rubber hand (Costantini & Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 
2004). However, because the rubber hand cannot physically be in the same location as the 
participant’s real hand, a certain amount of lateral displacement is allowed for. The lateral 
displacement at which the rubber hand illusion seems to break down is approximately 27.5 
cm (Lloyd, 2007). A fourth and final rule is the anatomical rule. The rubber hand must be 
shaped as a hand and not as a non-corporal object such as a giant broccoli. Control 
experiments have used objects less adventurous than broccoli to replace the rubber hand, 
such as a block of wood or a stick, but ownership cannot be induced for an object that does 
not resemble a hand (Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010; Tsakiris & Haggard, 
2005).  
These four rules (temporal, spatial, perspective, and anatomical) need to be met in order 
to induce the rubber hand illusion. What does this tell us about the perceptual mechanism of 
body-ownership? Each of these rules provide evidence for the idea that (illusory) body-
ownership depends on multisensory integration (Stein & Stanford, 2008). Multisensory 
integration refers to the process of binding two or more senses together into a single percept. 
For example, when you see a dog barking and you hear a barking sound, providing the two 
are synchronous (temporal rule) and from the same location (spatial rule), you will perceive a 
barking dog, i.e. visual information is integrated with auditory information to form one 
multisensory percept. Ownership depends on multisensory integration of vision, touch, and 
proprioception, creating the multisensory percept of a hand that belongs to you (Ehrsson, 
2012; Kilteni, Maselli, Kording, & Slater, 2015). In the rubber hand illusion, touch applied to 
the real hand is integrated with the visual appearance of the rubber hand being touched, 
which leads to the perception that they both relate to the same event, i.e. that they are the 
same touch. This phenomenon is known as referral of touch, and is one of the hallmarks of 
ownership illusions that rely on visuotactile integration. It follows the temporal rule and the 
spatial rule described above. The perspective rule is the rule for integrating vision and 
proprioception. Visual information of the orientation and location of the rubber hand needs 
to be integrated with the perceived location of the own hand. As described above, such 
integration can overcome spatial discrepancies of approximately 27.5 cm. The anatomical 
rule can also be interpreted as the congruence between visual and proprioceptive 
information. The proprioceptive sensation of having five fingers for example, only allows for 
the embodiment of an inanimate object with five fingers (e.g. a rubber hand).  
Visuotactile stimulation is not the only way in which ownership for the rubber hand can 
be induced. Another possibility is to synchronize movement of the rubber hand with 
movement of the real hand (Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012, 2014). In the moving rubber hand 
illusion, the index finger of the rubber hand, in view, is connected to the index finger of the 
participant’s hand, which is occluded. When the participant moves their finger while looking 
at the rubber hand that moves synchronously, ownership of the rubber hand is induced, 
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including proprioceptive drift and a SCR to a knife threat. This moving rubber hand illusion 
follows the same four rules as the original rubber hand illusion. In the case of active (intended) 
movement, the illusion results from the integration of intention (or efference copies) with 
vision and proprioception. 
1.1.2 Full-body illusion 
Since the rubber hand illusion, transferal of ownership to an alien object has been 
extended to ownership of an entire artificial body (Petkova, Björnsdotter, et al., 2011; Petkova 
& Ehrsson, 2008) (Figure 1B). In the full-body illusion, the participant wears a set of head 
mounted displays (HMDs) that are connected to two cameras facing down a mannequin 
(Figure 1B). The result is a first-person perspective of the mannequin’s body in 3D. The 
experimenter now touches the participant’s body and the mannequins body synchronously 
and spatially congruent. As in the rubber hand illusion, integrating the seen touch and the felt 
touch leads to the sensation that they are part of the same touch (referral of touch), and leads 
to ownership of the mannequin’s body, including a SCR to a knife threat (Petkova & Ehrsson, 
2008; van der Hoort et al., 2011). One difference with the rubber hand illusion is that there is 
no incongruence between proprioception and vision. The mannequin’s body is located where 
you sense your own body to be, so in contrast to the rubber hand illusion this discrepancy 
does not need to be resolved. As a consequence, proprioceptive drift cannot be measured in 
the full-body illusion. The full-body illusion relies on the same multisensory mechanism as the 
rubber hand illusion (Ehrsson, 2012; Kilteni et al., 2015). It therefore follows the same four 
rules of ownership, but with the anatomical rule referring to the necessity of a body shape 
instead of a hand shape (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; Petkova, Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 2011).  
1.1.3 Role of vision in body-ownership 
The rubber hand illusion exemplifies the dominance of visual information in body-
ownership. Proprioception is recalibrated towards the visual location of the rubber hand (i.e. 
proprioceptive drift), and tactile sensations are attributed to visual events on the rubber hand 
(i.e. referral of touch). Interestingly, the mere sight of a rubber hand from a first-person 
perspective in the absence of tactile stimulation can elicit proprioceptive drift, but not the 
subjective sensation of ownership (Rohde, Di Luca, Ernst, Gibson, & Bradshaw, 2011). 
Furthermore, when the visuoproprioceptive mismatch between the rubber hand and the real 
hand is abolished by using a ‘mirror-box’ such that the rubber hand appears at the exact 
proprioceptively perceived location of the real hand, the subjective sensation of ownership is 
instant (Dunphy, Evans, Klostermann, & Durgin, 2005). Another study found that in the 
absence of touch, a laser light moving over the rubber hand, could elicit the sensation of 
touch or heat (Durgin, Evans, Dunphy, Klostermann, & Simmons, 2007), which suggests that 
the visual appearance of touch can trigger tactile sensations. Taken together, these 
observations show that visual awareness is often the most important sensory modality in body-
ownership. 
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In addition, there seem to be a few purely visual restrictions on body-ownership, such as 
the perspective rule and the anatomical rule. To embody an object, the object’s shape and 
orientation matter. We cannot embody a giant broccoli, especially if it’s lying rotated on our 
plate. But as long as the perspective rule and anatomical rule are met, ownership illusions are 
rather flexible regarding visual input. For example, skin color does not affect the strength of 
the rubber hand illusion (Farmer, Tajadura-Jiménez, & Tsakiris, 2012), and participants can 
feel ownership of a body of the opposite sex (Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008). Furthermore, the size 
of a rubber hand does not have to match the size of the participant’s hand, although it 
appears easier to induce the illusion for larger hands than for smaller hands (Marino, Stucchi, 
Nava, Haggard, & Maravita, 2010). And, as will be discussed in more detail in section 1.2, 
ownership can be induced for bodies as small as 30 cm and as large as 400 cm (van der Hoort 
et al., 2011). 
However, one recent development in body-ownership research challenges the anatomical 
rule. In the invisible hand illusion there is no rubber hand in front of the participants 
(Guterstam, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2013). Instead, the experimenter is stroking in empty space 
while simultaneously stroking the participant’s occluded hand. The strokes in empty space 
outline the shape of a hand, and spatial congruency is maintained when stroking different 
fingers of the ‘invisible hand’. The tactile sensations are integrated with the visible moving 
brush, such that the touches seem to arise from empty space, and thus, that the participant 
now owns an invisible hand. The invisible hand paradigm is applicable to full-body illusions 
as well, inducing an invisible body illusion (Guterstam, Abdulkarim, & Ehrsson, 2015). These 
illusions follow the same rules of ownership as discussed above, except for the anatomical rule. 
Because of its shape, it seems unlikely that an invisible giant broccoli illusion could be 
induced, but this shape restriction could be explained by the spatial rule.  
Despite the dominance of vision in body-ownership, it seems unlikely that visual 
perception of our body is necessary for body-ownership, since this would imply that blind 
people cannot have body-ownership. In the absence of visual information, body-ownership 
can result from the multisensory integration of the remaining senses, such as proprioception 
and touch. In a variation of the rubber hand illusion in which participants are blindfolded 
(Ehrsson, Holmes, & Passingham, 2005), the veridical right hand is touched by the 
experimenter, while the left hand of the participant is guided to synchronously touch a rubber 
hand. This causes the sensation that participants are touching their own hand. Interestingly, 
this procedure is not effective in blind people (Nava, Steiger, Röder, Spence, & Röder, 2014; 
Petkova, Zetterberg, Ehrsson, Farne, & Roland, 2012), probably because they rely more on 
proprioception and touch in everyday life, making it harder to fool those senses.  
Returning to the role of vision in body-ownership, ownership illusions that rely on 
visuotactile and visuoproprioceptive congruencies have done so in the realm of conscious 
vision. However, awareness might not be necessary for multisensory integration, as has been 
shown for visual and auditory stimuli (Faivre, Mudrik, Schwartz, & Koch, 2014). Thus, if 
multisensory integration of vision, touch, and proprioception is sufficient for ownership, 
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awareness of those senses might not be needed. In Study IV, which will be introduced in 
more detail in section 1.3, we investigate the necessity for visual awareness in the visuotactile 
rubber hand illusion. In contrast to investigating the mechanisms of body-ownership 
themselves, the other studies that comprise this thesis examine the role of body-ownership on 
visual perception. Thus, the body-ownership illusions described in this section are used 
merely as a method to study an entire different field of research. The role of the body and 
body-ownership in visual perception will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
1.2 VISUOSPATIAL PERCEPTION 
1.2.1 Visual-cue approach 
Visuospatial perception concerns the visual perception of size and distance. It is important 
for our brain to know the size and distance of objects, for knowing how to move in order to 
interact with those objects, but also for identifying them – imagine mistaking a model car for 
a real one, or worse, the other way around. This does not seem a very complicated task. We 
look at something, and we immediately sense how big it is and how far away it is.  
Indeed, from a computational point of view, and given that our eyes and brain are close 
to perfect – which they are not – this is a simple calculation (Mckee & Smallman, 1998). 
When we look at an apple, both eyes have a retinal image of that apple that they send to the 
brain. The apple’s retinal size refers to the surface of the retina that receives light reflected 
from the apple. As you bring the apple to your mouth, its retinal size increases. This does not 
mean that it now appears larger, because your brain is quite familiar with the concept of size 
constancy, i.e., that objects don’t really grow as they move towards you, but that their retinal 
size increases with proximity. So, if the brain would know the distance of an object with a 
certain retinal size it would also know its actual size. According to this simple computational 
model, the only necessary information to calculate the distance of an apple is to assess its so-
called binocular disparity. Our two eyes are not in the same location and therefore have a 
slightly different retinal image of the apple. Alternate observation of an apple with only your 
left eye and with only your right eye, shifts the apple from the right to the left side of your 
visual field. If the apple has very different locations in the two retinal images, it must be 
nearby. Thus, the brain can use binocular disparity to calculate the apple’s distance, and by 
combining that with the retinal size, it knows its actual size. Problem solved. However, our 
visual system is not a video camera attached to a computing device. And combing retinal size 
with binocular disparity to calculate size and distance only works for objects within one meter 
from the observer (Leibowitz & Moore, 1966). So, unless you’re actually eating the apple, it 
would be hard to see its size and distance, if you were a camera attached to a simple 
computing device.  
But the human visual system is not a simple computer, it is at the very least a complex 
computer. It can use all kinds of different visual information, other than retinal size and 
binocular disparity. In fact, traditional textbooks on visuospatial perception use the visual cue 
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approach to emphasize that different visual cues work together to give a sense of distance, 
which can be combined with retinal size to calculate physical size (Cutting & Vishton, 1995; 
Goldstein & Bruce, 1999). Three categories of visual cues can be dissociated: pictorial cues, 
motion-based cues, and oculomotor cues. Pictorial cues are visual cues of depth that can be 
extracted from the content of the visual image you observe. These cues are all monocular 
cues, i.e. the information from one eye is sufficient to extract them. Pictorial cues are well 
known, mainly because they are important for (realistic) art and photography since they give 
the impression of depth to an otherwise two-dimensional object. At least seven pictorial cues 
can be dissociated. Linear perspective is used to describe the fact that parallel lines 
convergence to a single point on the horizon (O’Leary & Wallach, 1980). When driving a car, 
the visual system can use this knowledge to estimate the size of a car in the distance by 
calculating the ratio by which the sides of the road have converged near its location. Texture 
gradient is the fact that the detailed texture of certain surfaces seems to get denser with 
distance (Bajcsy & Lieberman, 1976). Let’s stay in the car but take a left turn onto that gravel 
road. Texture gradient refers to the individual pebbles that seem to get smaller and more 
densely packed the further you look. A third pictorial cue is clarity (Mather & Smith, 2002). 
Objects in the distance appear unclear because of small distortions caused by dust particles, 
fog, or warm air. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as aerial perspective. A fourth 
cue is occlusion, which simply refers to the fact that farther objects can be (partially) occluded 
by nearer objects. The fifth cue is the height on a plane of an object (Dunn, Gray, & 
Thompson, 1965), which informs us about its distance because an object further away is 
displayed “higher” on the retina, or closer to the horizon. A sixth cue is relative size: if two 
objects are of identical size, the relative size of one versus the other informs the visual system 
about their relative distance from the observer (Hochberg & McAlister, 1955). When both of 
your kids accidentally let go of their helium-filled balloon, you might be able to comfort them 
by stating how much further one balloon is than the other, based on their relative retinal size. 
To increase their joy even further, you could lecture them on how the speed of an individual 
balloon can be assessed by using the relative size cue for the same balloon from one moment 
in time to the next, because that balloon is not coming back (see below). The last pictorial cue 
is familiar size, which is the most relevant cue for this thesis. The familiar cue works by having 
knowledge of the size of an object that is located in close proximity to an object of unknown 
size (Hochberg & Hochberg, 1952). Imagine observing a tree from a distance; its actual size is 
much easier to perceive if someone is standing next to it, because you know what the height 
of the average human being is.  
We do not perceive the world as a series of still images from which we extract pictorial 
cues. Therefore, in addition to pictorial cues, there are additional cues that do not specifically 
depend on the content of an image, but instead on motion of the object or the observer. 
Motion parallax is a distance cue derived from movement of the observer (Rogers & Graham, 
1979). When an observer moves, such as when driving a car, stationary objects in the distance 
move more slowly over the retina than objects nearby. Another visual cue that is based on 
motion uses the change of an object’s retinal size. When an object is moving towards the 
observer, such as when a ball is approaching through the air, its retinal size increases. This 
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change in retinal size informs the visual system about the speed of the approaching object, 
and thereby also about its distance. This also works for departing objects, such as your kids’ 
ascending balloons. This cue is called depth from motion, or more descriptively ‘depth from 
optical expansion’ (Swanston & Gogel, 1986). A third motion-based cue is the kinetic depth 
effect (Wallach & O’Connell, 1953). The three-dimensional shape of an object is perceived 
from how its two-dimensional shape changes as a result of movement of that object (e.g. a 
rotating wire cube). However, this cue is not strictly speaking a distance cue, i.e. it allows 
objects to be perceived as three-dimensional but does not inform the visual system about their 
distance. 
A third category of visual cues is derived from the muscles that control the eye and its lens: 
oculomotor cues. Despite the fact that these cues are not visual in nature, they are still 
considered visual cues since they are part of the visual system. The ciliary muscles that cause 
flattening of the lens (i.e. accommodation) send signals to the visual system and are 
informative of the distance of an object in focus (Fisher & Ciuffreda, 1988). Similarly, the eye-
converging muscles can be informative of distance because a nearby object requires more 
eye-convergence than a distant object (Brenner & van Damme, 1998).  
The key to the visual cue approach is that all of these cues work in unison, and their 
relative contribution is different at different distances (Cutting & Vishton, 1995). Some cues 
are only informative at very short distances (e.g. accommodation), whereas others are only 
informative at greater distances (e.g. clarity). Occlusion is arguably the most potent distance 
cue, because it is effective at all distances. Although the visual-cue approach is still propagated 
in most vision textbooks when explaining spatial perception, alternative theories exist. The 
main objection of these alternative theories is that the visual-cue approach implies too strict a 
distinction between sensory input and motor output. To put it differently, we are not a video 
camera attached to a complex computer. We are our body. Our body acts and our body 
perceives. It perceives to act, and it acts to perceive. The following sections will discuss 
different approaches as to how our body and its actions are fundamentally part of visual 
perception in general and visuospatial perception in particular. 
1.2.2 New theory of vision 
The role of the body in visual perception has been debated for at least 300 years, and 
most scholars acknowledge George Berkeley to have started this debate when he wrote An 
Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (Berkeley, 1709). In this essay, he provides three 
arguments for how the body plays an important role in visual perception. First, Berkeley 
claims that to perceive a distance as such, is not a purely visual phenomenon. Instead, the 
perception of depth comes from the association of a certain distance with a certain pattern of 
movement, which in turn is associated with tactile and proprioceptive sensations. His second 
point states that vision is not only necessary for guiding preselected actions, but vision in itself 
motivates certain behaviors. A looming ball motivates trying to catch it, or step away. And 
thirdly, oculomotor information regarding eye-convergence and lens-accommodation are 
important distance cues, which, as mentioned above, have been adopted by the visual-cue 
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approach. In the centuries that followed, the idea that the body plays a fundamental role in 
visual perception was never really abandoned. However, exact formulations and 
conceptualizations would change with new empirical findings. Since the 20th century, at least 
two different approaches to the embodiment of visual perception can be identified: 
sensorimotor contingency theories and efferent readiness theories.  
1.2.3 Sensorimotor contingency theories 
According to sensorimotor contingency theories, the nature of visual perception is to 
know how sensory input will change with movement. To really understand this stance, it is 
important to understand the problem of visual direction constancy. When we visually 
perceive our environment, even if we think we are not moving, our eyes are still performing 
saccades: fast and automatic eye-movements between short periods of fixation. The entire 
visual field sweeps over our retina, from left to right and back again, with the speed of a 
saccade (900 degrees per second). However, our visual perception remains stable, we do not 
perceive the entire world to move around chaotically. According to the efference copy theory (von 
Helmholtz, 1925; von Holtz & Mittelstaed, 1950), the solution to this problem is efference 
copying. The idea being that when a motor command is sent to the eye-muscles to perform a 
saccade, an efference-copy is send to the visual system containing information about the 
direction and magnitude of that eye-movement, which is then used to cancel out any changes 
in retinal activation that are the result of the saccade. As elegant as this efference copy 
solution seems, it cannot entirely explain why saccades do not lead to apparent motion 
(Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975; Bridgeman & Stark, 1991). For example, in a completely 
dark environment a static light spot appears to move (the autokinetic effect; Levy & John, 
1972). As an alternative to this strict efference copy theory, efference copies have been 
suggested to guide attention towards the post-saccadic position of a ‘landmark object’ 
(Bridgeman, 2010; Deubel, Schneider, & Bridgeman, 2002) so as to assess if that landmark 
object has moved during a saccade or not. If after the saccade, the landmark object is in close 
proximity to its predicted location, it was probably stationary in external space. A final 
possible role of efference copies is to shift receptive fields, i.e. they can cause a spatial 
remapping of individual neurons (Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1992). 
The reafference theory differs from the previously discussed efference copy theory in that 
efference copies are not simply cancelling out eye movements, but instead serve as a cue to 
tap into the stored knowledge of the sensory consequences of movement (Held, 1961). 
Movement in this sense is not restricted to saccades but applies as well to slow eye 
movements, head movements, and body movements. What is crucial about this theory, is that 
this knowledge is acquired in the past. We have all learned that if our head rotates to the 
right, our entire visual field moves to the left, except if we are fixating on a moving object, 
such as a car. The reafference theory further states that an important function of knowing 
how movement will affect future sensations is that of visually guided movements. The 
experimental method that contributed most to this idea of learned sensory consequences of 
(intended) movement is that of optical rearrangement devices (ORDs): a set of goggles that 
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can either rotate, reverse, or laterally displace the entire visual field. George Stratton was the 
first to experiment with such devices, on himself (Stratton, 1897). He wore a set of inverting 
ORDs for eight consecutive days: his world was upside down. Initially he was not able to 
perform any motor task whatsoever, but gradually his vision improved, and at the end of the 
experiment his visual world appeared “right side up” and “in normal position”. A few 
decades later Helmholtz performed experiments with ORDs that cause lateral displacement 
(16-18 degrees to the left) of the visual field to study reaching behavior (von Helmholtz, 1925). 
After the initial overshoot in reaching, adaptation took place and reaching was as accurate as 
before wearing the goggles. Interestingly, this adaptation also transferred to the other hand, 
which he had not trained in the reaching task, which suggests a general visuomotor 
recalibration. After removing the ORD, an aftereffect in the opposite direction occurred. A 
few decades later it was found that such adaptation occurs when there is active movement but 
not when there is solely passive movement (Held & Hein, 1958). Others however have found 
adaptation after passive movements (Singer & Day, 1966) and even in the absence of 
movement (Howard, Craske, & Templeton, 1965; Kravitz & Wallach, 1966). Critics of the 
reafference theory have proposed that ORD-induced adaptation occurs as a result of 
visuoproprioceptive conflict itself rather than reafferent visual information. According to these 
critics, increased adaptation after (active) movement is the result of a (greater) conflict 
between where the hands are visually perceived to be and where they are proprioceptively felt 
to be (Harris, 1965; Welch, 1978). Furthermore, what seems to be adapting is not visual 
perception, but proprioception. When Stratton (1897) claimed that the world appeared “right 
side up” and “in normal position” he did not mean that the floor was down and the ceiling up 
again. Instead, he meant that he would feel an object (by touch) where he visually perceived it 
to be, that things made sense again. The proprioceptive information from movements stayed 
the same, but the meaning assigned to that information changed by the recipient brain areas. 
They now signify a movement in the distorted visual space, instead of the normal visual space 
(Harris, 1965).  
The enactive approach is the most contemporary theory on sensorimotor contingency, and 
can be viewed as an extension of the reafference theory. One major difference is that the 
enactive approach does not assume that the function of visual perception is to guide motor 
behavior (Noë, 2004). Instead, conscious visual perception itself depends on learned 
contingencies between movement and subsequent changes in visual information. According 
to Noë, the perception of a three-dimensional object, i.e. the perception of it being 
voluminous, starts with the visual appearance of that object as a two-dimensional patch: of it 
having a certain “perspective-shape” (P-shape) and a certain “perspective size” (P-size). Only 
in combination with the understanding of how P-shape and P-size would change with 
movement can the object be perceived for what it really is: its three-dimensional shape and 
size. For example, if you look at a table from a certain angle, it appears as a trapezoid with 
two legs, which is its P-shape. Knowing how this object would change its P-shape with 
movement is necessary for perceiving its actual three-dimensional shape. It is important to 
note that this does not mean that active behavior needs to take place, or even that the object 
allows for certain behavior. In addition to ORDs, the enactive approach uses observations 
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from another important experimental method, which was not available at the time of the 
reafference theory, known as tactile-visual sensory substitution (TVSS) (Figure 2). As its name 
implies, TVSS is the replacement of visual perception with that of tactile perception, often in 
people who are blind, in such a way that visual space can be perceived by touch (Bach-y-Rita, 
2004; Bach-y-Rita & Kercel, 2003; Maidenbaum, Abboud & Amedi, 2014; Sampaio, Maris, 
& Bach-y-Rita, 2001). A TVSS-device consists of a matrix of electrodes attached to a person’s 
body, which gives tactile stimulation in response to input from a low-resolution video camera. 
At first, sensations from such a device are purely tactile in nature. However, after extensive 
training most people do not perceive the tactile sensations anymore, but instead report to 
have vision-like experiences of objects in external space. These people can report the size, 
shape and location of an object, and even perform simple visuomotor tasks. They can “see” 
with touch. Similar findings have been found for audio-visual sensory substitution (AVSS) 
(Bach-y-Rita, 2004; Bach-y-Rita & Kercel, 2003; Maidenbaum et al., 2014; Ward & Meijer, 
2010). AVSS-devices convert brightness to loudness, and the spatial location to frequency. 
After a few months of training, this leads to similar vision-like experiences of objects in 
external space, such that blind people can see with their ears. The crucial observation for the 
enactive approach, is that active training is required to obtain these results of TVSS and 
AVSS. Self-initiated movement is necessary for learning the change from sensorimotor 
contingencies specific for touch or sound to the sensorimotor contingencies specific for vision 
(Hurley & Noë, 2003).  
1.2.4 Efferent readiness theories 
Efferent readiness theories of visual perception state that an integral part of seeing is that it 
triggers preparation of action, instead of the preparation of action merely being a 
consequence of vision (Taylor, 1962, 1965, 1968). Patients with frontal lobe damage 
sometimes display automatic behavior that is associated with a certain object (Frith, 
Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Seeing a bottle of water and a glass will make these people 
pour the glass with water whether they are thirsty or not. Healthy individuals do not display 
Figure 2. Tactile-visual sensory substitution (left) and audio-visual sensory 
substitution (right), adapted from Maidenbaum et al. (2014). © Amir Amedi 
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such automatic behavior but that does not mean that there is no ‘efferent readiness’ to do so. 
Neuro-scientific studies show that perception of an object is accompanied by a preparedness 
of the motor system to act upon that object (Jeannerod, 2006; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008).  
According to one recent version of such theories, the disposition theory, sensory information 
only leads to spatial perception if it triggers some behavioral disposition. To determine the 
spatial location of an object, sensory input and possible motor programs are both required 
(Grush, 2000, 2007). The main idea is that sensory information and motor planning are both 
formulated in terms of egocentric spatial coordinates. This means that space perception is 
where sensory input and motor output meet, and therefore space itself is represented 
holistically as a combination of the two. And thereby, the representation of space provides a 
framework (or language) for the brain’s input and output to communicate in.  
Another good example of an efferent readiness theory is the ecological perception theory 
(Gibson, 1977, 1979). Its unique character is based on the emphasis of bottom-up processes, 
in contrast to top-down theories of vision (e.g. representationalism). According to this theory, 
the optical environment is informative in and of itself, without the need for a Cartesian 
observer to interpret that information. Therefore, ecological perception is also known as 
‘direct perception’. Gibson uses the term invariants for those aspects of our optical 
environment that contain valuable information without the need for a top-down 
interpretation of them. In this sense, most visual cues described in 1.2.1 can be viewed as 
invariants. However, a more radical claim, which is relevant here, is that visual perception is 
essentially the interaction between an animal and its environment (hence ‘ecological 
perception’). Gibson (1977) introduces the term affordances to describe the nature of visual 
perception. Perceiving an object is perceiving what that object affords us to do (e.g. Mark, 
1987; Warren, 1984; Warren & Whang, 1987). A flat surface affords one to sit on it, a handle 
on a cup affords one to grasp it, etc. Crucially, different animals have different affordances 
and therefore perceive the world differently. And similarly, different people perceive the 
world differently because their environment contains different affordances. If an adult sees a 
four-feet vertical elevation it affords for climbing, whereas a small child does not perceive this 
affordance but instead might perceive it as to afford for leaning. Thus, the physical properties 
of the observer define how objects in external space are perceived. For example, spreading 
your arms makes an aperture appear narrower because it does not afford to walk through it 
with that posture (Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009). Similarly, increasing one’s action radius by 
holding an elongated tool makes distances appear shorter (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005). 
An elaboration of the role of affordances, or ‘action possibilities’, on visual perception has 
been proposed by Proffitt (2006). According to Proffitt, perception is not only influenced by 
what types of actions the environment allows for, but also the energy costs of those actions, as 
well as our individual skills to perform those actions. For example, wearing a heavy backpack 
makes hills appear steeper (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999) and distances appear greater (Proffitt, 
Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003), because it costs more energy to climb that hill or to 
walk that distance when wearing a backpack. Similarly, fatigued individuals and unfit people 
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perceive the slope of a hill to be steeper (Proffitt, Bhalla, Gossweiler, & Midgett, 1995). In 
addition, skills can affect visual perception. Skilled baseball players perceive the baseball to be 
larger (Witt & Proffitt, 2005) and skilled golf players perceive the hole to be larger (Witt, 
Linkenauger, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2008).  
1.2.5 Own-body-size effect 
Each of the different embodied perception theories described above would predict that a 
child perceives the world as being larger, i.e. that the perceived size of the world is inversely 
related to the body size of the observer. However, these theories differ with respect to the 
underlying mechanisms of such an effect. Sensory motor contingency theories would claim 
that the (potential) movement of a child has different sensory consequences than that of an 
adult. Efferent readiness theories and the ecological approach however, would state that the 
body of a child allows for, or affords, different potential action. And according to the action-
costs based perception, a child would perceive the world to be larger because a child requires 
more steps to cover a certain distance. However, apart from anecdotal evidence, until 
recently it had not been possible to directly test the intuitive prediction that the perceived size 
of the world is inversely related to the body size of the observer. How can we manipulate 
body-size in a controlled experiment? The answer has been given in section 1.1: body-
ownership illusions.  
Six years ago we published a variation of the full-body illusion in which we replaced the 
adult-sized artificial body (180 cm) with a small doll (80 cm: small-body illusion; Figure 3A) or 
a giant custom-made artificial body (400 cm: large-body illusion; Figure 3B) (van der Hoort et 
al., 2011). Using ownership questionnaires and SCRs to a knife threat, we established that 
ownership for these bodies is possible. Similar to the traditional full-body illusion, ownership 
was abolished by asynchronous visuotactile stimulation. Logically, in these versions of the full-
body illusion it is crucial that brushing of the artificial body is scaled to its size, such that the 
small doll receives shorter strokes, and the giant body receives longer strokes, than the strokes 
given to the participant’s veridical body. In subsequent experiments, we tested participant’s 
perception of object size and object distance during these illusions. To this end, participants 
Figure 3. Small-body illusion (A), different sized bodies (B), and bimanual size estimations for small body vs 
large body, and synchronous vs asynchronous visuotactile stimulation. Adapted from van der Hoort et al. (2011). 
  15 
were lying on a bed because it enabled them to see their body while being able to see a large 
part of the testing room. Because we wanted to rule out any contribution of visual cues (e.g. 
linear perspective, height on a plane, etc.), the height of the cameras that looked down on the 
artificial body was identical in the small-body illusion and the large-body illusion. As a 
consequence, the small artificial body needed to be elevated by placing it on a bed, while the 
large artificial body was lying on the ground, such that they had an identical first-person 
perspective (i.e. the angle from which they observed the artificial body).  
In two different experiments, participants verbally estimated the size of target objects, or 
they used their hands to indicate the perceived size of target objects (i.e. bimanual size 
estimation). In two other experiments, they verbally estimated the perceived distance of target 
objects or they walked the perceived distance while blindfolded. Verbal report can be 
considered a more explicit measure of size and distance perception, whereas bimanual 
estimations and walking distance are more implicit measures, however both measures gave 
similar results. As expected, participants perceived the size of target objects to be larger 
during the small-body illusion and smaller during the large-body illusion (Figure 3, right 
panel). And similarly, they perceived the distance of target objects to be greater during the 
small-body illusion and shorter during the large-body illusion. Crucially, these effects were 
significantly diminished when ownership was disrupted due to asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation. Thus, ownership was necessary to maximize the effect of body-size on the 
perception of object size and distance. Therefore, we proposed the term own-body-size effect to 
describe this pattern of results. In Study I and II we investigated the possible mechanisms by 
which ownership might affect visuospatial perception. 
Other studies have described similar body-scaled effects on visual perception. The visual 
distortion of a participant’s veridical hand affects the perceived weight of objects by following 
the size-weight illusion, i.e. smaller objects are perceived to be heavier despite equal weight 
(Haggard & Jundi, 2009). Furthermore, changing perceived hand size in a virtual reality 
environment inversely changes the apparent size of objects close to the hand (Linkenauger et 
al., 2013). And embodying a child-like avatar in a virtual reality environment causes objects 
to be perceived as larger (Banakou, Groten, & Slater, 2013). These findings are in line with 
the own-body-size effect, and therefore strengthen the conclusion that the perceived size of 
the world is inversely scaled to the body size of the observer.  
 
1.3 VISUAL AWARENESS 
Having discussed the spatial content of visual perception, and how our body plays a key 
role therein, we now turn to another fundamental aspect of vision, visual awareness. Visual 
awareness is a major topic in philosophy, psychology and neuroscience. It is not only studied 
for understanding visual awareness per se, but also for understanding consciousness in general 
(Crick & Koch, 1998; Lamme, 2006). The reductionist neuroscientist believes that the basic 
neural processes that underlie visual awareness, apply to other sensory modalities as well, and 
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even apply to the awareness of higher cognitive functions, such as self-awareness (Crick & 
Koch, 1998). How these different ‘awarenesses’ are bound together to create one unitary 
consciousness is only a follow-up question, i.e. the binding problem is a secondary problem. 
Similarly, to understand visual awareness of the simplest visual stimulus, such as a horizontal 
line, is to understand visual awareness of the rich scenes we perceive during everyday life, i.e. 
their difference lies in the complexity of the stimulus, not in the complexity of their underlying 
mechanisms. Creating a unitary conscious percept of a visual scene from simple elements of 
visual awareness is merely another version of the binding problem. Therefore, given the 
popularity of the reductionism among neuroscientists, the study of visual awareness is often a 
synonym for the study of consciousness. To be clear, despite the importance of visual 
awareness research in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (Crick & Koch, 
1998), this thesis will focus on visual awareness itself. The remainder of this section will focus 
on two phenomena that are often used to study it: binocular rivalry and continuous flash 
suppression. 
1.3.1 Binocular rivalry 
In binocular rivalry, each eye is presented with a different (incompatible) image. Instead of 
those images being fused into a single percept, such as in normal stereoscopic vision, 
conscious visual perception alternates between the two images roughly every few seconds. For 
example, presenting the image of a face to one eye, and the image of a house to the other eye, 
might initially result in the conscious perception of the face. At this moment, the face image is 
said to be dominant, and the house image to be suppressed. After a few seconds, perception 
switches to the house, and the face is suppressed. These perceptual switches continue to occur 
infinitely at irregular intervals (following a gamma distribution; Levelt, 1965). Thus, during 
binocular rivalry conscious perception alternates despite constant visual input (Figure 4).   
Crucially, these alternations occur automatically and cannot be stopped by will. 
Instructing participants to keep one image dominant as much as possible renders only small 
and unreliable shifts in the overall dominance of that image (Meng & Tong, 2004; van Ee, 
van Dam, & Brouwer, 2005). Because of this automaticity, binocular rivalry has been 
hypothesized to occur relatively early in visual processing. In line with this hypothesis, fMRI 
studies have found that activity in the primary visual cortex reflects conscious perception 
Figure 4. Binocular rivalry. Adapted from Dieter & Tadin (2011). 
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during binocular rivalry (Polonsky, Blake, Braun, & Heeger, 2000; Tong & Engel, 2001). 
Furthermore, when the images presented to each eye are reversed during ongoing rivalry, the 
dominant eye remains dominant (Blake, Westendorf, & Overton, 1980; Lee & Blake, 2004), 
such that perception switches to the image that is now presented to the currently dominant 
eye. This suggests that the two eyes are competing for awareness, and that competition must 
be resolved “early” by neurons that receive monocular input. However, there is also evidence 
for competition at a later stage of visual processing. Activity of neurons at later stages of visual 
processing, which invariably receive binocular input, correlate much more with the ongoing 
percept than neurons at early stages (Logothetis & Schall, 1989; Logothetis, Leopold, & 
Sheinberg, 1996). In addition, reversing the visual input to each eye back and forth very 
quickly (5 Hz) results in normal rivalry durations (Logothetis et al., 1996). This suggests that 
not the eyes, but instead the images themselves are competing. Indeed, presenting each eye 
with complementary patchworks of two images results in the rivalry of those images, and not 
of the two patchworks (Kovács, Papathomas, Yang, & Fehér, 1996). These seemingly 
contradicting findings are accounted for by contemporary models of binocular rivalry that 
argue for multiple sites of competition at different stages of visual processing (Tong, Meng, & 
Blake, 2006).  
What makes a visual stimulus more dominant during binocular rivalry? Levelt (1965) 
introduced the term stimulus strength to refer to those aspects of the visual stimulus that make it 
more dominant. In its original formulation these included contrast, density, and blur of the 
image contours. More recent studies have added several other visual characteristics that 
increase the stimulus strength, such as motion (Blake, Zimba, & Williams, 1985; Bossink, 
Stalmeier, & de Weert, 1993; Wade, De Weert, & Swanston, 1984), spatial frequency 
(Arnold, Grove, & Wallis, 2007; Fahle, 1982), color contrast (Bossink et al., 1993), and overall 
luminance (O’Shea, Blake, & Wolfe, 1994). In addition to the strength of the rivaling stimuli, 
binocular rivalry is also affected by secondary visual factors. One example is the visual context 
of the rivaling stimuli. If the rivaling stimuli are surrounded by a certain visual context, 
dominance tends to increase for the stimulus that is congruent with that context (Blake & 
Logothetis, 2002; Sobel & Blake, 2002). In addition to visual context, the familiarity of a 
stimulus can also increase its dominance, as is the case for upright faces versus inverted faces 
(G. Zhou, Zhang, Liu, Yang, & Qu, 2010), for recognizable figures versus unrecognizable 
figures (Yu & Blake, 1992), and for words versus non-words (Wolf & Hochstein, 2011).  
The most obvious measure of binocular rivalry is the percentage of time a stimulus is 
dominant, i.e. overall dominance. When an experimental manipulation causes the overall 
dominance of a stimulus to increase, this can be mediated by prolonged dominance durations 
or by shortened suppression durations. These two temporal characteristics are independent of 
one another, they depend on distinct neural mechanisms, and they are affected differently by 
different experimental manipulations (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). For example, increasing the 
stimulus strength of one of the stimuli has an asymmetrical effect. Perhaps counterintuitively, 
it mainly shortens the average suppression duration of that stimulus, and increases dominance 
durations only little, if at all (Bossink et al., 1993; Brascamp, Klink, & Levelt, 2015; Levelt, 
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1965; Mueller & Blake, 1989). The fact that increasing the strength of one stimulus, leads to 
shorter percepts of the other stimulus can be explained by reciprocal inhibition models of 
binocular rivalry (Tong et al., 2006). Apart from dominance and suppression durations, a 
third temporal characteristic of binocular rivalry is the overall switch rate. This is a measure 
of the combined perceptual stability of both stimuli. Increasing the strength of both rival 
stimuli to a similar degree causes the overall switch rate to increase robustly (Brascamp et al., 
2015; Levelt, 1965). 
As mentioned before, voluntary control during binocular rivalry is very limited. Voluntary 
(endogenous) attention can slightly increase dominance durations of the attended stimulus, 
but it leaves its suppression durations unaffected (Ooi & He, 1999; Paffen & Alais, 2011). 
Thus, the effect of attention on the temporal characteristics of binocular rivalry follows the 
reverse pattern of that of stimulus strength. This should not be surprising, since attending to 
something that is not visible is paradoxical. Involuntary (exogenous) attention on the other 
hand can also shorten suppression durations, but it does so mainly by making a perceptual 
switch more likely in general (Ooi & He, 1999). Another interesting effect is that withdrawing 
attention from both rivaling stimuli, by increasing irrelevant task demands, slows down the 
switch rate of binocular rivalry (Paffen, Alais, & Verstraten, 2006). However, it does not stop 
perceptual switches completely, no matter how distracted a participant is, which shows that 
attention is certainly not necessary for binocular rivalry to occur (Paffen & Alais, 2011).  
1.3.2 Cross-modal effects in binocular rivalry 
Recently, various cross-modal effects on binocular rivalry have been demonstrated. For 
each of these effects, nonvisual sensory stimulation increases the overall dominance of a 
congruent visual stimulus. Based on the effects of stimulus strength and attention described 
above, an important dissociation needs to be made between cross-modal effects that merely 
increase the dominance duration of the congruent visual stimulus, and those that shorten 
suppression durations as well. In the first report of such a cross-modal effect on binocular 
rivalry, looming sounds increased the dominance duration of a looming visual stimulus but 
suppression durations remained unaffected (van Ee, van Boxtel, Parker, & Alais, 2009). This 
effect was amplified by tactile stimulation from the vibrating speaker (van Ee et al., 2009). 
Thus, looming sounds only had an effect during visual awareness of the congruent stimulus, 
and therefore voluntary attention could potentially explain the result. In fact, such a 
mediating role of attention was specifically tested. Participants were instructed to perceive the 
looming stimulus as much as possible. The co-occurrence of the looming sound increased the 
effect of voluntary attention. However, no change was found when participants were 
instructed to perceive the incongruent rivaling stimulus as much as possible. Similar 
audiovisual interactions have been described for directional sounds with moving visual stimuli 
(Conrad, Bartels, Kleiner, & Noppeney, 2010), melodic sounds with written musical notes 
(Lee, Blake, Kim, & Kim, 2015), and the sound of syllables with the congruent motion of lips 
(Vidal & Barrès, 2014). In each of these studies, the increased overall dominance was due to 
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prolonged dominance without shortened suppression. Therefore, the effects can (partly) be 
explained by top-down attention.  
However, nonvisual sensory stimulation has also been shown to decrease suppression 
durations of congruent visual stimuli (often in combination with prolonged dominance 
durations). Such a pattern of results is similar to the effect of increased stimulus strength. The 
most elaborate description of such a cross-modal effect is that of touch. During binocular 
rivalry between orthogonally oriented visual gratings (as in Figure 4), the active exploration of 
a haptic gradient increases the overall dominance of the congruent visual stimulus, by 
elongating dominance and shortening suppression (Lunghi, Binda, & Morrone, 2010). These 
effects only occur when the spatial frequency of the gratings (Lunghi et al., 2010) as well as 
their orientation (Lunghi & Alais, 2013) are congruent. Interestingly, placing the haptic 
grating away from the perceived location of the visual grating abolishes the effect (Lunghi & 
Morrone, 2013). This suggests that the haptic gradient and the visual stimulus need to be 
perceived as one and the same object, i.e. that they follow the spatial rule of multisensory 
integration. In a follow-up study, it was found that the depth of suppression was truly reduced 
by the congruent haptic stimulus, instead of the haptic stimulus merely weakening the stability 
of the incongruent rivaling stimulus (Lunghi & Alais, 2015). In addition to this visuotactile 
interaction, the shortening of suppressions has been found for a moving stimulus that is 
congruent with active hand movements (Maruya, Yang, & Blake, 2007), for a visual stimulus 
that is congruent with olfactory stimulation (the image of a rose and the smell of a rose; Zhou, 
Jiang, He, & Chen, 2010), and for a visual stimulus that is congruent with ecologically 
relevant sounds (the image of a bird and the sound of a birdsong; Chen, Yeh, & Spence, 
2011). Such rescue of a visual stimulus from suppression through cross-modal interactions has 
been hypothesized to be indicative of multisensory awareness (Deroy et al., 2016). According 
to this hypothesis, the observed visual grating and the felt haptic grating mentioned above are 
perceived as one and the same object through multisensory integration. The multisensory 
awareness of that object would then effectively increase the visual stimulus strength of that 
object.  
Now, let us return to body-ownership. As described in section 1.1, body-ownership is 
essentially caused by multisensory integration of vision, touch, and proprioception (Ehrsson, 
2012). It is a clear example of multisensory awareness, albeit more special than that of an 
external object. For one, it incorporates all possible senses, including proprioception. 
Furthermore, our body is the most relevant object there is – it is who we are. We move it 
around to accomplish our goals, and we need to defend it against threats. Therefore, it seems 
logical that visual awareness of our body would be prioritized. To put it differently, body-
ownership should boost the visual awareness of our body. Study III combines binocular 
rivalry with the rubber-hand illusion to test this novel hypothesis, thereby building on the 
existing knowledge of binocular rivalry, including the roles of attention and stimulus strength. 
We predict that if one of the rivaling stimuli during binocular rivalry is the image of a hand 
for which ownership is experienced, the stimulus strength of that image should be greater, 
compared to when no ownership is perceived for that same hand. 
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1.3.3 Continuous flash suppression 
Another method to study visual awareness is continuous flash suppression (CFS). During 
CFS one eye is presented with a flickering high-contrast stimulus (i.e. the mask), while the 
other eye receives a visual stimulus of interest. It could be interpreted as a special case of 
binocular rivalry, in which the stimulus-strength of the mask is so great that it prevents the 
other visual stimulus from reaching awareness for long periods of time. Not only does CFS 
induce very long suppression durations, the suppression is also much deeper than that in 
traditional binocular rivalry (Tsuchiya, Koch, Gilroy, & Blake, 2006).   
Which aspects of a visual stimulus hasten a break through suppression? This question is 
rather similar to the question of what decreases the suppression duration during binocular 
rivalry. However, a crucial difference is that participants are not aware of the content of the 
suppressed visual stimulus. Thus, confounding factors that might play a role in binocular 
rivalry, such as attention, memory, and response bias are abolished. Unsurprisingly, the 
stimulus strength of the suppressed stimulus affects the speed with which it is rescued from 
suppression (Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005; Yang et al., 2012). And similar to what had been 
described for binocular rivalry, it is affected by the familiarity of the visual stimulus. Upright 
faces (Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007) and upright bodies and body parts (Stein, Sterzer, & 
Peelen, 2012) are detected faster then when these stimuli are upside down. And finally, cross-
modal effects have been described. Moving lips are recovered from suppression faster when 
they are accompanied by congruent speech (Alsius & Munhall, 2013), which is indicative of 
an audiovisual interaction. And the orientation of a hand image that is congruent with the 
orientation of an observer’s hand speeds the recovery of that image from suppression 
(Salomon, Lim, Herbelin, Hesselmann, & Blanke, 2013), suggesting a facilitating effect of 
proprioception. Other effects on the suppression duration during CFS include that of priming 
and working memory (for a review, see Gayet, van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014).  
In line with its hypothesized effect on binocular rivalry, we predicted that body-ownership 
would decrease the time needed for a hand image to break through suppression. But how can 
ownership be experienced for a hand that is not consciously seen? Would it be possible to use 
visuotactile stimulation to induce a rubber hand illusion during CFS, i.e. without visual 
awareness of the hand and the touches applied to it? A suppressed stimulus in CFS is 
processed outside of awareness and can affect conscious perception and other cognitive 
functions in a large variety of ways (for a review, see Yang, Brascamp, Kang, & Blake, 2014). 
The provocative idea that it might be possible to induce unconscious ownership originates 
from three main observations, two of which consist of visual information that needs to be 
processed in the absence of awareness. First, the brain would need to know that the image of 
a hand is hidden behind the mask, and that this hand is oriented in such a way that it could 
be part of the body. Second, it would need to process the movement of the masked object that 
is touching the masked hand. Indeed, both the orientation of a hand image (Salomon et al., 
2013) and the motion of a stimulus (e.g. Itoh, Fujii, Kwee, & Nakada, 2005; Koivisto, 
Mäntylä, & Silvanto, 2010; Maruya, Watanabe, & Watanabe, 2008) are processed in the 
absence of visual awareness. A third necessity for unconscious ownership would be 
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multisensory integration of the unconscious visual stimulus with the tactile stimulus. Evidence 
for such integration is derived from Study III and from the studies of Lunghi and colleagues 
(2010, 2013, 2015) in which a tactile stimulus shortens the suppression duration of a visual 
stimulus. In fact, multisensory integration (audiovisual) can occur in the absence of awareness 
of both sensory modalities (Faivre et al., 2014). Thus, the requirements for an unconscious 
version of the rubber hand illusion seem present, and in Study IV we provide evidence for 
such an effect. Subsequently, we use this unconscious rubber hand illusion to assess the effect 
of unconscious ownership on the recovery from suppression. 
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2 AIMS 
The general aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between body-ownership 
and visual perception. More specifically, we sought to determine the effect of body-ownership 
on two fundamental aspects of visual perception: visuospatial perception and visual 
awareness, and to assess the necessity of (visual) awareness in body-ownership.  
 
• The aim of Study I was to examine the relative contribution of different potential 
mechanisms by which body-ownership could affect the perceived size of objects in the 
own-body-size effect.  
 
• The aim of Study II was to investigate the mechanism by which body-ownership 
initiates a rescaling of external space in the own-body-size effect.  
 
• The aim of Study III was to investigate the effect of body-ownership on visual 
awareness of one’s own body.  
 
• The aim of Study IV was to examine the possibility of body-ownership in the absence 
of awareness, and to investigate the effect of such unconcious ownership on visual 
suppression.  
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3 METHODS 
3.1 PARTICIPANTS 
All participants (n = 245) were recruited from the Stockholm student population. They 
had normal vision, or corrected to normal vision with contact lenses. Wearing glasses was not 
possible because of the physical restrictions of the head mounted displays. Participants gave 
their written informed consent prior to the experiment, and importantly all were naïve to the 
purpose of the studies. Experiments were approved by the Regional Ethical Review Board of 
Stockholm and were in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki.  
 
3.2 HEAD-MOUNTED DISPLAYS 
In each experiment, visual stimuli were presented through a set of head-mounted displays 
(HMDs). The choice of HMDs was an important step in designing the experiments, since 
each of them have their advantages and disadvantages. Selecting the right HMDs for an 
experiment was based on the purpose of that particular experiment, and often required 
piloting. We used three different HMDs. In Study I we used the CybermindVisette Pro PAL 
(Cybermind Interactive, Maastricht, the Netherlands; display resolution = 640 × 480, 
diagonal field of view = 71.5°). The advantage of this system is its relatively wide field of view, 
while its drawback is its low resolution. Because Study I investigates visuospatial perception, a 
wider field of view is preferred over a higher spatial resolution. In Study II we used the 
Oculus Rift HMDs (Oculus VR, Menlo Park, California, United States; display resolution = 
1920 x 1080, diagonal field of view = 110°), which has a higher display resolution as well as a 
wider field of view than the CybermindVisette Pro PAL, but was not available at the time of 
Study I. Another advantage of the Oculus Rift HMDs is that they allow for the playback of 
videos, which was necessary in Study II, whereas the CybermindVisette Pro PAL only allows 
for a live display of the input of two cameras. In Study III and Study IV we used the VR1280 
(Virtual Realities LLC, League City, Texas, United States; display resolution = 1280 x 1024, 
diagonal field of view = 60°). Despite a lower resolution than the Oculus Rift, its effective 
resolution per degree of visual field is higher due to its narrow field of view. Since Study III 
and Study IV did not require a wide field of view, the VR1280 was preferred. The VR1280 
allows for the playback of videos as well, which was a necessity for Study III and Study IV. 
Another big advantage of the VR1280 is the ability to manually adjust the distance between 
the two displays, so as to match participants’ individual inter-ocular distance. The one major 
disadvantage of the VR1280 is their lack of comfort compared to the Oculus Rift, which 
becomes noticeable during the course of a typical experiment (30 – 60 minutes). 
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3.3 VISUAL AND TACTILE STIMULI 
Acquiring optimal visual stimuli can be a timely process that relies on the creation and 
piloting of many different stimuli versions to assess their effectivity. The following sections 
give an overview of the visual stimuli that were used in the different studies, as well as some 
considerations that led to the choice of these stimuli.  
3.3.1 Stimuli of Study I 
In Study I, the HMDs displayed the real-time input from two cameras (Protos IV, Vista, 
Workingham, Berkshire, United Kingdom) that were mounted to a tripod. The height of the 
tripod was identical for different conditions in order to match for visual cues, such as linear 
perspective and the height-on-a-plane of target objects. The cameras were facing down a 
small artificial body (80 cm) or a large artificial body (400 cm), rendering a three-dimensional 
first-person perspective of those bodies. Cameras were tilted in such a way that the bodies 
were visible from the waist down, i.e. the chest was not visible, so as to maximize the visible 
portion of the testing room, which included a door, a desk, and a chair. These visible objects 
could have functioned as a familiar size cue against our hypothesized effect, but were 
included to increase the ecological validity of our experiments. During visuotactile 
stimulation, participants could see a small ball attached to a stick (hereafter referred to as 
‘tactile probe’) stroking the lower legs and feet of the artificial body (Figure 5A,D). The size of 
the tactile probe and the length of the strokes were proportional to the size of the artificial 
body. In the synchronous conditions, participants’ veridical body and the artificial body were 
touched synchronously and spatially congruent at corresponding body-parts. In the 
Figure 5. Visual stimuli (A-C) and experimental setup (D,E) of Study I. Visuotactile stimulation phase (A), 
occlusion of the upper half of the visual field (B), and target object presentation (C). Synchronous visuotactile 
stimulation (D) and object size estimation (E). Small red ball (A,B) is participants’ fixation point in Experiment 
2. 
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asynchronous conditions these touches were asynchronous and applied to non-corresponding 
body-parts (but matched in terms of overall tactile stimulation, i.e. the two lower legs and 
feet). The reason for violating both the temporal rule (synchronicity) and the spatial rule 
(spatial congruence) in the asynchronous conditions was to maximize the disruption of 
ownership. After one minute of visuotactile stimulation, the lower half of the visual field, in 
which the artificial body was located, was occluded (Figure 5B). A few seconds later, a target 
object (10 cm, 20 cm, or 30 cm) appeared in the upper half of the visual field at 1.2 m from 
the cameras (Figure 5C,E). The occlusion was removed before the start of the next trial. The 
visual stimuli of Experiment 2 were identical to those of Experiment 1, except for the addition 
of a fixation ball that was hanging from a fishing line at a fixed distance (1.5 m) in each 
condition. This distance was close enough to either body to prevent those bodies from 
appearing blurry, whilst still being behind the location of target objects. As a result, upon 
target object presentation, the fixation ball was occluded and fixation was automatically 
moved to the target object. In Experiment 3, target objects appear either near (1.0 m) or far 
(6.0 m) from the cameras.  
3.3.2 Stimuli of Study II 
Study II used prerecorded videos instead of a real-time display as in Study I. Videos were 
recorded with two cameras (CamOne Infinity, CamOneTec, Delbrück, Germany), and 
processed using Final Cut Pro X (Apple Inc., Cupertino, United States). In the videos, an 
empty room was visible, with a bed in the foreground in the small-body conditions (Figure 6). 
A brush would enter the field of view at regular intervals, brushing in empty space at four 
different locations, matching both lower legs and both feet of either a small (80 cm; Figure 
6A) or a large (400 cm; Figure 6C) invisible body. The videos contained an audio-track that 
Figure 6. Visual stimuli of Study II. Visuotactile stimulation phase (A) 
and target object presentation (B) during small invisible body 
conditions, and during large invisible body conditions (C,D).  
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was only audible to the experimenter, which was used to synchronize tactile stimulation with 
the visual appearance of touch as seen in the videos. We used pre-recorded videos in Study II 
because it was not possible to reliably touch the correct parts of empty space without having a 
body to guide the brush movement. Again, tactile stimulation of participants’ veridical body 
was either synchronous or asynchronous with the observed touches. After one minute of 
visuotactile stimulation, a target object appeared at 1.5 m from the cameras (Figure 6B,D).  
3.3.3 Stimuli of Study III 
In Study III, the HMDs were not used for stereoscopic vision, but to induce binocular 
rivalry. Binocular rivalry stimuli were created using Final Cut Pro X. One eye was presented 
with the image of a hand on a red background (Figure 7). The hand image was generated 
using a photo of a hand on top of a green screen, which allowed for isolation of the hand. The 
red colors of this image were enhanced, without the hand appearing unnatural, in order to 
maximize the color contrast between the two rivaling images, and thereby decrease piecemeal 
rivalry (see section 3.6). The other eye was presented with randomly generated Mondrian 
masks consisting of different sized rectangles in different shades of blue. A new Mondrian 
mask appeared every 0.1 s (10 Hz). Three layers were added on top of each of these rivaling 
stimuli, and were therefore visible at all times. Both stimuli were surrounded by a white circle, 
and both stimuli contained a fixation cross in the middle of the stimulus. In addition, both 
stimuli contained a moving tactile probe, i.e. a small ball on a stick. The moving tactile probe 
layer was created by covering the same hand that was used for the hand stimulus with a green 
screen and recording a video of the tactile probe approaching the hand from the side, 
stroking it from the back of the hand to the tip of the index finger, and then withdrawing from 
the hand to the starting position. Using the green screen this way, allowed for the isolation of 
this visual layer and its addition to both rivaling stimuli. If the moving tactile probe would 
only be present in the hand stimulus, it would greatly increase the relative strength of that 
stimulus, such that the hand would be dominant almost continuously. Tactile stimulation was 
applied to participant’s veridical hand synchronous to the movement of the tactile probe by 
listening to an audio track. 
Figure 7. Visual stimuli (A-D) and experimental setup (E) of Study III. Visuotactile and visual-only conditions 
(A), and tactile-only and no-stimulation conditions (B) of Experiment 1. Congruent visuotactile and visual-only 
conditions (C) and incongruent visuotactile and visual-only conditions (D) of Experiment 2. Panel E displays 
the experimental setup during a congruent visuotactile trial. 
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3.3.4 Stimuli of Study IV 
In Study IV, we used the same HMDs as in Study III, but this time for the purpose of 
continuous flash suppression (CFS). One eye was presented with the same Mondrian masks 
that were used in Study III. This masking stimulus was identical in each of eleven videos that 
were created for Experiment 1a and Experiment 2. The other stimulus consisted of the same 
hand image as used in Study III, but with a black background instead of a red background 
(Figure 8). In addition, the brightness of the hand was lowered to 50% of the original 
brightness, which was the maximum brightness used in this study. In one video, the 
brightness of the hand increased linearly from 0% to 50% in 240 seconds. This video was 
used in Experiment 1a to assess the brightness at which the hand would break through 
suppression for an individual participant. Subsequently, one of ten videos would be selected 
based on the highest hand brightness that was suppressed. In these ten videos, the brightness 
of the hand was fixed, ranging from 2.5% to 25% (in 2.5% increments) of the original 
brightness (Figure 8A,B). In Experiment 1b, the Mondrian mask was removed, while the 
hand was at 50% brightness (Figure 8C,D). And in Experiment 2, the video from Experiment 
1a was used in which brightness increased linearly over time (Figure 8E,F). The tactile probe 
layer used in Study III, was made entirely black in order for it to disappear in the black 
background when it was not stroking the hand, and for it not to be visible next to the circular 
stimuli. Importantly, in Study IV, the tactile probe layer was only added to the hand image. 
This was done in order to prevent the possibility of participants experiencing an invisible 
hand illusion during dominance of the mask (Guterstam et al., 2013). A white fixation cross 
was present in the middle of each stimulus. Again, tactile stimulation was cued through an 
audio track listened to by the experimenter, which consisted of strokes from the back of the 
hand to the tip of the index finger.  
 
  
Figure 8. Visual stimuli of Study IV. Congruent condition (A) and incongruent condition (B) of Experiment 1a, 
and of Experiment 1b (C,D). Congruent condition (E) and incongruent condition (F) of Experiment 2 in which 
the brightness of the hand image increases over time.  
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3.4 MEASURING OWNERSHIP 
In Studies I-III, the manipulation of body-ownership is used as a method to investigate its 
effect on visual perception, whereas in Study IV, body-ownership is the primary dependent 
variable of interest. However, to confirm its successful manipulation, body-ownership was still 
measured in the first three studies. The measure of choice was subjective report of ownership 
on a standardized questionnaire. At the end of the main part of the experiment, on a separate 
trial, participants rated different statements on a seven-point Likert-scale ranging from -3 to 
+3, where -3 indicates “strongly disagree”, 0 indicates “do not agree, do not disagree”, and 
+3 indicates “strongly agree”. The exact formulation depended on the details of the 
experiment, i.e. whether the experiment used a full-body illusion (Study I), an invisible body 
illusion (Study II), or a hand-ownership illusion (Study III and IV). However, all 
questionnaires had in common that they included ownership statements to capture the 
experience of ownership (e.g. “It felt as if the body I saw was my body”), and control 
statements to capture expectancy effects and task compliance effects (e.g. “It felt as if I had 
two bodies at the same time”). The difference between the mean ratings of illusion statements 
and the mean ratings of control statements was calculated as a measure of the illusion strength. 
The success of ownership manipulation was assessed by statistically comparing the illusion 
strength between conditions of interest. And in order to gain more insight into different 
aspects of the illusion, the median rating on single illusion statements was statistically 
compared between conditions. Apart from confirming a successful manipulation of 
ownership, the ownership questionnaire also allowed for the statistical testing of possible inter-
individual correlations between ownership and its effect on visual perception. Such 
correlations are suggestive of a direct link between ownership and visual perception, and 
could therefore support the conclusions drawn from the main results. 
 
3.5 MEASURING SIZE PERCEPTION 
Each experiment in Study I and Study II measured size perception in four conditions in 
which body-size and visuotactile synchrony were manipulated in a 2x2 full factorial design: 
small-synchronous, small-asynchronous, large-synchronous, and large-asynchronous. Two 
different measures of size perception were used: bimanual estimation and verbal report 
(similar to van der Hoort et al., 2011). For bimanual estimations, participants were instructed 
to indicate the perceived size of a target object by holding their two hands in front of them 
(Figure 5E), while the experimenter measured the distance between the palms of their hands. 
A tap on the back of their hand was used to communicate to the participant that they could 
lower their hands. In Experiment 1b of Study I we used verbal report, in which participants 
were instructed to verbally estimate the size of target objects “as quickly and accurately as 
possible”. A significant drawback of verbal report is that participants are much more 
inaccurate and inconsistent, as compared to bimanual estimation. Verbal report can be 
interpreted as a more explicit measure, whereas bimanual estimations are more implicit. 
Furthermore, since bimanual estimation is an action-based measure of object size, whereas 
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verbal report is not, the two measures might rely on different visual processing streams in the 
brain. Bimanual report would depend more on the dorsal stream, which processes ‘vision for 
action’, whereas verbal report would depend more on the ventral stream, which processes 
‘vision for perception’. Naïve participants were recruited for each experiment, and therefore, 
the data presented in this thesis do not allow for a correlation between these two measures.  
A crucial aspect of measuring size perception in Study I and Study II, is that all statistical 
comparisons were carried out within participants, since the variability between participants 
could overshadow the effects of our experimental manipulations. Therefore, each participant 
was included in each condition, and analyses were performed on normalized differences 
between those conditions, i.e. the difference between conditions was divided by individual 
averages. The reason for normalization is that, in addition to decreasing random inter-subject 
variability, it provides a better measure of changes in perception. For example, perceiving an 
object as 10 cm during the small-body illusion, and as 5 cm during the large-body illusion, is 
phenomenological analogue to a change from 40 cm to 20 cm, and therefore these outcomes 
should be weighted equally. Taking the mere difference between conditions (10 – 5 = 5; and 
40 – 20 = 20) does not account for the similarity of these perceptual changes.    
 
3.6 MEASURING VISUAL AWARENESS 
In Study III we used binocular rivalry to measure visual awareness. Experiment 1 
consisted of four conditions in a 2x2 full-factorial design in which the visual and tactile 
component of touch (touch of the hand in the image and touch of participant’s veridical 
hand) were either present or absent: visuotactile, visual-only, tactile-only, and no-stimulation 
(Figure 7A,B). In addition, we included a baseline condition that was identical to the no-
stimulation condition, but with participants’ veridical right hand folded back to their left 
abdomen. Comparing this baseline condition to the no-stimulation condition would show the 
possible influence of visuoproprioceptive congruence per se. Experiment 2 also consisted of 
four conditions in a 2x2 full-factorial design, but here we manipulated the orientation of the 
hand (right-side up/congruent or inverted/incongruent), and the tactile stimulation of 
participants’ veridical hand. The moving tactile probe was visible in each condition because 
Experiment 1 had shown a large effect of this moving object on dominance, rendering the 
visual-only condition as the most appropriate baseline. The four conditions were: congruent 
visuotactile, congruent visual-only, incongruent visuotactile, and incongruent visual-only 
(Figure 7C,D). 
Participants in Study III were instructed to fixate on the fixation cross at all times. During 
a test trial, participants could manually adjust the distance between the two displays to match 
their individual inter-ocular distance, after which the distance was fixed for the remainder of 
the experiment. In both experiments, participants were naïve to binocular rivalry, and 
therefore the test trial was also used to familiarize participants with the phenomenon. 
Although testing naïve participants is not standard in binocular rivalry research, the need for 
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participants to be naïve to the rubber hand illusion excluded participation of most people in 
the department. Participants were required to be naïve to the rubber hand illusion to prevent 
expectancy effects from confounding the results. Importantly, the binocular rivalry data that 
was used for analysis was gathered before a separate trial tested participants’ subjective 
experience of ownership.  
Participants’ right hand was placed on a custom-made titled platform in such a way that 
their hand would be in the same retinal location as the hand image if they were to take of the 
HMDs (Figure 7E). Therefore, there was no visuoproprioceptive incongruence to be resolved 
by the rubber hand illusion. Participants were instructed to press and hold a button, 
indicating which of the two stimuli was most dominant at any given time. When a patchwork 
of the two images was perceived (i.e. piecemeal rivalry), participants responded as to which 
image was the most dominant. In general, piecemeal rivalry is an unwanted phenomenon, 
especially when the contribution of both images gets close 50/50, because it is more difficult 
for participants to assess the dominant percept, and therefore it may be more prone to 
response biases. Visual stimuli of larger retinal size are more likely to result in piecemeal 
rivalry, especially during the transition between two dominant percepts. The largest retinal 
size of simple stimuli, such as orthogonal line elements, that prevents piecemeal rivalry 
altogether is 1.0 degree (Blake, O’Shae & Muller, 1992). However, for more complex stimuli 
such as faces this maximum retinal size is much larger (6.0 degrees) (Alais & Melcher, 2007). 
Given that the average retinal size of a hand is approximately 10 degrees when the arm is 
stretched, a trade-off had to be made between the hand being realistically large enough to be 
embodied but not so large as to induce too much piecemeal rivalry. Based on pilots with 
different sized stimuli, the optimal trade-off appeared to be a stimulus size of 10 degrees, with 
the hand being 8.5 degrees.  
Experiment 2 of Study III used an inverted hand as a control condition, in which 
ownership for the hand would not be induced, despite synchronous visuotactile stimulation, 
because of the incongruence between vision and proprioception. Another way to abolish 
ownership is to apply asynchronous visuotactile stimulation, such as in Study I and Study II. 
There are several reasons why asynchronous visuotactile stimulation was not preferred in this 
experiment. First, the control condition was supposed to disentangle the effect of ownership 
from synchronous visuotactile stimulation per se. Second, since asynchronous stimulation does 
not lead to multisensory integration, it would effectively double the amount of perceived 
sensory events, and this could have unanticipated effects that are difficult to interpret. And 
third, asynchronous stimulation might be a source of exogenous attention related to error-
monitoring, which could affect dominance durations (see 1.3.1) but this would relate to a 
different research question.  
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3.7 MEASURING UNCONSCIOUS OWNERSHIP 
In Experiment 1a of Study IV we aimed at developing a rubber hand illusion in the 
absence of visual awareness of that hand (i.e. the unconscious rubber hand illusion), by 
applying continuous flash suppression (CFS) to the hand image. We compared two conditions 
with identical synchronous visuotactile stimulation, but with the hand-image oriented right-
side up or inverted, i.e. congruent or incongruent.  
As described in section 3.3.4, the first part of the experiment was to assess participants’ 
individual threshold for the hand image brightness that could be suppressed. In the second 
part of the experiment, participants fixated on the fixation cross while they received tactile 
stimulation of their hand. Two measures of body-ownership that are well described in body-
ownership research were used: skin conductance response (SCR) to a knife threat and 
proprioceptive drift (see section 1.1.1). Because we wanted to measure proprioceptive drift, 
the participants’ right hand was not placed at the exact location of the hand image as in Study 
III, but instead it was placed 20 cm to the right. To ensure that participants would not rotate 
their head towards their hand, they had their chin placed on a chin-rest, restricting such 
movement. To measure the SCRs, two electrodes were attached, one to the index finger of 
the left hand and one to the middle finger of the left hand. After one minute of tactile 
stimulation, a knife would appear to stab the masked hand on 50% of the trials. This knife 
was present in both the mask-stimulus and the hand-stimulus, rendering it clearly visible to 
the participant. The other half of the trials were used to measure proprioceptive drift. Before 
the start of every trial, participants’ left index finger was placed on a vertical metal bar that 
hung over the table on which participants’ right hand was placed. Participants were to slide 
their finger towards the perceived location of their right index finger. The reason for 
performing this hand localization task at the onset of each trial was to keep participants naïve 
as to whether the knife would appear or not. If the knife did not appear at the end of a trial, a 
second hand localization task would be performed to complete the proprioceptive drift 
measure (defined as the difference between the two hand localization tasks).  
Experiment 1b was identical to Experiment 1a, except for the stimuli used (see 3.3.4), and 
without the assessment of individual brightness thresholds at the start of the experiment. 
Instead, in Experiment 1b, an additional trial was included for both conditions at the end of 
the experiment after which participants filled in an ownership questionnaire.   
Experiment 2 was designed to test the prediction that unconscious ownership would 
hasten the break through suppression of the hand-image. To this end, we used the video of 
Experiment 1a in which the brightness of the hand linearly increased over time. Participants’ 
hand was synchronously touched with touches applied to the masked hand. Crucially, in 
contrast to Study III and as described in 3.3.4, the moving tactile probe that touched the 
hand in the image was masked as well. Participants pressed one of two buttons to indicate the 
orientations of the hand as quickly as possible. 
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4 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
4.1 STUDY I 
The own-body-size effect on visuospatial perception as described in van der Hoort, 
Guterstam and Ehrsson (2011) states that the perceived size and distance of objects is 
inversely related to the body size of an observer. In the small-body illusion objects appear 
larger and further away, and vice versa, in the large-body-illusion objects appear smaller and 
closer by. The presence of body-ownership was shown to maximize this effect. We 
hypothesized that body-size rescales the entire spatial layout of external space, independent of 
visual cues. Indeed, experiments in the original publication of the own-body-size effect (van 
der Hoort et al., 2011), controlled for most visual cues. The distance of target objects from the 
cameras remained the same in each condition, thus the retinal size of target objects in these 
conditions was identical. Additionally, regarding the remaining visual information, all but the 
size of the artificial body was identical across conditions. Thus, pictorial cues, such as 
occlusion, texture gradient, or linear perspective could not explain the own-body-size effect. 
And since neither the participants nor the cameras moved, motion based visual cues could 
not have played a role either. However, despite the fact that the original publication of the 
own-body-size effect controlled for most visual cues, we identified two possible mechanisms 
by which visual cues could have contributed to the effect.  
Firstly, body-ownership could enhance the contribution of the visible body as a familiar size 
cue. The idea here is that observing a body from the natural first-person-perspective would be 
a very important cue for the size and distance of other objects. In the presence of ownership, 
i.e. when it is your own body that you are observing, the contribution of this familiar size cue 
could be greater. Therefore, in Experiments 1a and 1b we assessed the contribution of the 
body as a familiar size cue by occluding the body after induction of the full-body illusion but 
before the presentation of target objects (Figure 9A-B). We found that occluding the body did 
not abolish the own-body-size effect, and therefore, the body as a familiar size cue cannot 
explain the effect of ownership on visual perception. Interestingly, in the asynchronous 
control conditions of Experiment 1a and 1b, objects were perceived as being of equal size, 
unaffected by whether participants had seen a small body or a large body before target 
objects appeared. This is different from the initial report on the own-body-size effect, in 
which a small effect was described for the asynchronous conditions as well. Thus, the body-
size effect in the absence of ownership seems to be caused by the visible body being used as a 
familiar size cue, which is effectively prevented when the body is occluded. 
A second possibility is that body-ownership could enhance the contribution of oculomotor 
cues. In van der Hoort et al. (2011), when a target object entered the field of view, participants 
moved their fixation from the body to the object. Since the distance between target objects 
and the cameras was constant, participants’ fixation changed differently in the small-body 
illusion and the large-body illusion. In the small-body illusion, participants’ eyes had to 
diverge in order to move fixation from the body towards target objects, whereas in the large-
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body illusion, participants’ eyes had to converge. Similarly, accommodation of the eyes’ 
lenses changed differently in the two body-size conditions. If the contribution of these 
oculomotor cues were to be larger in the presence of ownership, because they are more 
informative when the own body is involved, they could explain the own-body-size effect. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2, we controlled for these oculomotor cues by having participants 
fixate on a fixation point during the induction of the full-body illusion. The location of this 
fixation point was identical for all conditions, and therefore changes in eye-vergence and 
accommodation were identical. In addition, this procedure controlled for possible attentional 
differences between ownership and no-ownership conditions. Experiment 2 resulted in an 
own-body-size effect of similar size as that in Experiment 1a, and similar to Experiment 1a, 
asynchronous stimulation completely abolished the effect (Figure 9C). Thus, oculomotor cues 
do not seem to play a role in the own-body-size effect. We also included an ownership 
questionnaire on a separate trial after the size estimation trials and found that the stronger 
participants experienced the illusion, the stronger their own-body-size effect was. 
 
Figure 9 Main results of Study I. Bimanual size estimations in Experiment 1a (A), verbal 
size estimations in Experiment 1b (B), and bimanual size estimations in Experiment 2 
(C) and Experiment 3 (D), as a percentage deviation from individual means. 
Small/Large = small and large artificial bodies; synchronous/asynchronous = 
synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation. ***p < 0.001. 
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The combined results of Study I and the original publication (van der Hoort et al., 2011) 
indicate that, during object size perception, the effect of body size depends on two independent 
additive mechanisms. The body that is seen from the natural first-person perspective can act 
as a familiar size cue. This effect is independent of ownership since disrupting ownership 
through asynchronous visuotactile stimulation does not entirely abolish it (van der Hoort et 
al., 2011). Additionally, body-ownership of a different sized body causes a recalibration of 
external space, which leads to changes in object size perception. This effect is independent of 
visual cues since occluding the body, and controlling for fixation does not terminate the 
recalibration (Study I).  
An additional aim of Study I was to assess the spatial extent to which such recalibration 
applies. The space that surrounds our body and in which we can directly act, i.e. peripersonal 
space, is represented differently from space that is further away (Fogassi et al., 1996; Holmes & 
Spence, 2004; Makin, Holmes, & Zohary, 2007; Tamar R. Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 
2008). It could be argued that scaling visual space to body-size is especially useful for objects 
that we can immediately act upon, and therefore that the own-body-size effect might be 
greater in peripersonal space. In contrast, if the own-body-size effect reflects a true 
recalibration of external visual space, there should be no difference between different parts of 
space. To distinguish between these two alternatives, we compared the own-body-size effect 
close to the body (1 m from the cameras) and far from the body (6 m from the cameras). The 
results of Experiment 3 show that the own-body-size effect does not reduce with increased 
distance of target objects (Figure 9D). Thus, the visual recalibration is not specific for 
peripersonal space, but instead affects visual space equally at different distances. 
 
4.2 STUDY II 
Study I showed that once the full-body illusion is induced, visibility of the body is no 
longer necessary for the own-body-size effect. However, the question remains as to whether a 
visible body is necessary to induce a recalibration of visuospatial perception. In the presence of 
ownership, the visible body could have acted as a familiar size cue to initiate the rescaling of 
external space. On the other hand, in line with our hypothesis, a visible body might not be 
necessary for the initial visual recalibration of external space to occur. We hypothesized that 
similar to body-ownership, the effect of body size depends on a multisensory mechanism that 
updates the link between the somatosensory defined body-space and the visually defined 
external space. In Study II we tested this hypothesis directly by combining the invisible body 
illusion with the small-body illusion and the large-body illusion.  
We found that despite the lack of a visible body, the own-body-size effect could still be 
induced. Participants experienced ownership of a small invisible body and a large invisible 
body after synchronous visuotactile stimulation, but not after asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation. Object size estimations differed significantly between synchronous and 
asynchronous conditions. Target objects were perceived to be larger during the small invisible 
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body illusion, and to be smaller during the large invisible body illusion (Figure 10A). As in 
Study I, we found that the perceptual effect correlated positively with subjective measures of 
the ownership illusion (Figure 10B), which provides further evidence for the idea that the 
rescaling of visual space depends on body-ownership. Interestingly, the effect size in Study II 
was similar to the effect sizes found in Study I, which suggests that a visible body does not 
contribute at all to the induction of the own-body-size effect. Instead of a visible body being 
used as a familiar size cue to induce the own-body-size effect, the effect appears to be caused 
by visuotactile realignment and a direct coupling between body-space and external space. In 
the small invisible body, touches close to the camera are integrated with tactile sensations of 
the feet and legs. In order for such integration to occur, the representation of visual space 
needs to expand, causing all objects in space to be perceived as larger and further away. Vice 
versa, in the large invisible body illusion, touches far from the camera are integrated with these 
tactile sensations, which requires visual space to shrink. In summary, the results of Study II 
indicate that the own-body-size effect is induced through a recalibration of visual external 
space by realigning it to somatosensory body-space. 
 
  
Figure 10. Main results of Study II. Bimanual size estimations as a percentage deviation 
from individual means (A), and the rank-based correlation between the ownership effect 
(illusion score difference between synchronous and asynchronous conditions) and the 
perceptual effect (interaction term between Small/Large and synchronous/asynchronous) 
(B). Small/Large = small and large artificial bodies; synchronous/asynchronous = 
synchronous and asynchornonous visuotactile stimulation. **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001. 
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4.3  STUDY III  
Where the first two studies investigated the effect of body-ownership on visuospatial 
perception, the third study focused on its effect on visual awareness. Given that our own body 
is the most important visual object that exists – it is who we are – it seems a logical prediction 
that our brain prioritizes visual information from the body to reach awareness. To be more 
precise, we hypothesized that under identical visual stimulation, visual awareness should be 
promoted for a hand when ownership of that hand is experienced. We combined the rubber-
hand illusion with binocular rivalry, in two separate experiments, to investigate this 
hypothesis. 
In Experiment 1, we compared four conditions that differed solely on the presence or 
absence of the visual and tactile components of touch: visuotactile, visual-only, tactile-only, 
and no-stimulation. Ownership of the hand was successfully induced in the visuotactile 
condition, as measured by an ownership questionnaire. Crucially, the overall dominance of 
the hand percept was greatest in the visuotactile condition compared to all other conditions 
(Figure 11A). Further evidence for a direct effect of ownership on visual awareness was 
Figure 11. Main results of Study III. Overall dominance of the hand percept (A), the correlation between illusion 
score and overall dominance increase in the visuotactile condition compared to no-stimulation (B), and 
normalized percept durations in Experiment 1 (C). Overall dominance of the hand percept (D) and normalized 
percept durations (E) of Experiment 2. Combined percept durations of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 for the 
(congruent) visuotactile condition normalized to the (congruent) visual-only condition (F). Colors refer to 
conditions specified in panels A and D. †p = 0.06, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001, and n.s. = not significant. 
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obtained from a positive correlation between subjective ownership ratings and the overall 
dominance increase in the visuotactile condition (Figure 11B). In Experiment 2, we compared 
the effect of synchronous visuotactile stimulation on a congruent hand image with its effect on 
an incongruent hand image (congruent visuotactile vs congruent visual-only, and incongruent 
visuotactile vs incongruent visual-only). Ownership ratings were higher for the congruent 
visuotactile condition compared to the incongruent visuotactile condition. And again, overall 
dominance was highest for the condition in which ownership was perceived: the congruent 
visuotactile condition (Figure 11D). These effects of ownership on the overall dominance of 
the hand percept were driven by a combination of longer dominance durations and shorter 
suppression durations (Figure 11C,E,F). The reduced suppression durations indicate that 
ownership effectively increased the stimulus strength of the hand image, and that the effect of 
ownership cannot be explained by increased endogenous attention towards the hand. 
Furthermore, although we found that the switch rate was higher for conditions in which the 
moving tactile probe was part of the visual stimulus, no such difference was found for 
conditions with identical visual stimuli, which indicates that participants attended to the 
rivaling stimuli to a similar degree in different conditions.  
Figure 12 The effect of ownership (2x2 interaction term in Experiment 1 (A) and 
Experiment 2 (B)) before and after the onset of individual touches (t = 0-667 ms). The 
effect of individual touches on the probability of a perceptual switch from mask to hand, 
split for pre-touch period (-667 – 0 ms) and touch period (0 – 667 ms) in Experiment 1 
(C) and Experiment 2 (D). Colors refer to conditions specified in Figure 9A,D (blue = 
visuotactile; light-blue = visual-only; green = tactile-only; light-green = no-stimulation; 
red = incongruent visuotactile; light-red = incongruent visual-only). * p < 0.05. 
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Further analyses separated the continuous effect of ownership from the transient effect of 
single touches. We utilized the exact knowledge of the onset and duration of individual 
touches to calculate the dominance of the hand percept before (-667 – 0 ms), during (0 – 667 
ms), and after (667 – 1334 ms) a single touch. We observed that the visual component of 
single touches (i.e. motion of the tactile probe) caused a transient dominance increase of the 
hand percept. Importantly, we also found an independent continuous effect attributable to 
ownership itself, defined as the interaction-term in both experiments (Experiment 1: 
[visuotactile – visual-only] – [tactile-only – no-stimulation]; Experiment 2: [congruent 
visuotactile – congruent visual-only] – [incongruent visuotactile – incongruent visual-only]), 
which could not be explained by single touches (Figure 12A,B). In fact, this interaction effect 
was highest before the onset of a touch, which shows that the visual and tactile component of 
a single touch increased dominance only temporarily, whereas the effect of ownership was 
continuous. Next, we investigated the effect of single touches on individual percepts, by 
calculating the percept-stability when the hand was perceived, and the likelihood of a 
perceptual switch when the mask was perceived, both before (-667 – 0 ms) and during (0 – 
667 ms) a touch. We found that single touches increased the stability of hand percepts, which 
was independent of the additional effect of ownership (i.e., no interaction-effect). 
Furthermore, single touches increased perceptual switches if a mask was perceived, but only 
when ownership was present (Figure 12C,D). Thus, individual touches increased dominance 
durations independent of ownership, and they reduced suppression durations only when 
ownership was present. This latter finding shows that, in the presence of ownership, 
multisensory integration occurs between a suppressed visual stimulus and conscious tactile 
stimulation. 
In summary, ownership of the hand promotes visual awareness of that hand. It does so by 
lengthening individual percepts of the hand, and by shortening its suppression. This pattern 
of results suggests that ownership effectively increases the stimulus strength of the hand image. 
Furthermore, the results were specific to ownership of the hand, and could not be attributed 
to single visuotactile events, nor could they be explained as an attentional effect. 
 
4.4 STUDY IV  
In Study IV we aimed to induce ownership of a hand through visuotactile stimulation in 
the absence of visual awareness. The rationale for the possibility of such unconscious 
ownership was partly based on the results of Study III: visual information from a suppressed 
hand can be integrated with tactile information. And it was partly based on studies that 
describe the processing of visual information, and the occurrence of multisensory integration, 
outside the realms of visual awareness (see section 1.3.2). We combined the rubber hand 
illusion with continuous flash suppression (CFS), such that all visual information that is 
relevant for the illusion was suppressed, i.e. the hand and the tactile probe that touches it. 
Unconscious ownership was measured by proprioceptive drift and by SCR to a knife threat.  
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In Experiment 1a, we compared two conditions that differed solely on the orientation of 
the hand image: congruent and incongruent. In the congruent condition, after one minute of 
tactile stimulation, participants perceived the location of their veridical hand to be shifted 
towards the location of the hand image (i.e. proprioceptive drift), and they displayed 
autonomous fear responses to knife threats at the location of the suppressed hand (i.e. SCR) 
(Figure 13). Crucially, both proprioceptive drift and SCRs were significantly reduced in the 
incongruent condition. Thus, unconscious ownership could be induced for a masked 
congruent hand, but not for a masked incongruent hand. 
In Experiment 1b, the mask was removed to render the hand clearly visible to 
participants. Again, participants showed proprioceptive drift and SCRs in the congruent 
condition but not in the incongruent condition. Interestingly, the effects in Experiment 1b 
were of similar magnitude as the effects in Experiment 1a, suggesting that visual awareness 
did not increase ownership in this study. Participants in Experiment 1b also subjectively 
reported stronger sensations of ownership during the congruent condition compared to the 
incongruent condition, as measured by an ownership questionnaire.  
Next, in Experiment 2, we assessed the effect of unconscious ownership on visual 
awareness by measuring the suppression duration of the hand during CFS. This suppression 
duration was measured on four conditions: congruent visuotactile, congruent visual-only, 
incongruent visuotactile, and incongruent visual-only. We found that, while suppressing all 
relevant visual information, synchronous visuotactile stimulation reduced suppression 
durations but only when the suppressed hand had a congruent orientation. Thus, the 
condition in which unconscious ownership could be measured in Experiment 1a, also 
hastened the rescue from suppression of the hand-image in Experiment 2. This suggests that, 
similar to conscious ownership (Study III), unconscious ownership can boost the hand into 
visual awareness. 
Figure 13. The main results of Study IV. Mean proprioceptive drift (A) and skin conductance response (B) in 
the congruent (blue) and incongruent (red) condition of Experiment 1a. Mean suppression duration during 
visuotactile conditions (dark shading) and visual-only conditions (light shading) in Experiment 2 (C). *p < 0.05, 
**p < 0.01, †p = 0.06. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
Body-ownership and visual perception have been major topics in philosophy and 
psychology for centuries. Although their possible interaction was first formalized “only” 300 
years ago, the assumption that our body size somehow defines our visual perception, e.g. the 
intuitive idea that a child perceives the world differently than an adult, must be as old as 
mankind. However, it was not until the recent development of body-ownership illusions, that 
these intuitions and assumptions could be subjected to scientific endeavors. By effectuating 
these illusions, the four studies that comprise this thesis contribute to our understanding of the 
role of body-ownership in visual perception, and the role of visual perception in body-
ownership. In Study I and II we investigated the mechanisms by which body-ownership 
causes the perceived size of the world to scale inversely to the size of our body. In Study III 
we showed that body-ownership can boost visual awareness. And in Study IV we found 
evidence for unconscious body-ownership, i.e. body-ownership in the absence of visual 
awareness.  
 
5.1 BODY-OWNERSHIP AND VISUOSPATIAL PERCEPTION 
The own-body-size effect states that the perceived size of the world is inverse to the size of 
our own body, such that the world looks larger to a small observer, and vice versa, the world 
looks smaller to a large observer. By inducing full-body illusions with different sized artificial 
bodies, it was shown that body-ownership is necessary to maximize this effect of body-size 
(van der Hoort et al., 2011). In Study I and II we investigated the relative contribution of four 
possible mechanisms by which body-ownership could potentially contribute to changes in 
visuospatial perception. First, the body, as seen from the natural first person perspective, 
could serve as a stronger familiar size cue when ownership of that body is experienced (Study 
I, Experiment 1). Second, oculomotor cues could play a stronger role in the presence of body-
ownership (Study I, Experiment 2). Third, the observed body might function as a strong 
familiar size cue in order to initiate a perceptual rescaling of external space (Study II). These 
three mechanisms could not explain our findings. Instead, the results of Study I and Study II 
are only congruent with a fourth mechanism: The spatial realignment of vision and touch, 
which is necessary for the induction of body-ownership illusions, automatically updates visual 
space beyond the body by a direct link between body-space and external space. Importantly, 
this recalibration of external space is independent of the distance from the observer (Study I, 
Experiment 3). The clearest demonstration of this mechanism was shown in Study II. In the 
invisible small body illusion, the observed touch is initially nearer than the felt touch, and 
therefore external space must be expanded in order to perceive a single visuotactile that is 
applied to one’s own body. Vice versa, in the large invisible body illusion, the observed touch is 
initially observed further away than the felt touch, and the representation of external space 
needs to be shrunken. The representation of object size and distance is thought to be 
automatically updated with the updated representation of visual space, such that they expand 
in the small-body illusion and shrink in the large-body illusion. In this sense, the own-body 
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size effect exemplifies that touch and proprioception can dominate vision, which is opposite to 
the dominant role of vision in most ownership illusions (see section 1.1.3). To illustrate the 
reciprocity between external space and body size, the own-body-size effect can also be viewed 
from an external (allocentric) perspective. The own body can be viewed as providing ‘a 
system of axes of coordinates’ in which external space is represented. Having a smaller body, 
effectively shrinks the three-dimensional grid that such axes of coordinates define. As a result, 
the same object now fills more grid-cells that comprise external space, and will therefore be 
perceived as larger. This idea is visualized in Figure 14.  
Despite the consistent use of visuotactile ownership illusions in Study I and II, the inter-
sensory recalibration that underlies the own-body-size effect does not necessarily depend on 
visuotactile realignment. In ownership illusions that use visuomotor synchrony (Dummer, 
Picot-Annand, Neal, & Moore, 2009; Kalckert & Ehrsson, 2012; Tsakiris, Prabhu, & 
Haggard, 2006), a visuomotor realignment might similarly recalibrate the visual perception of 
space. For example, in virtual reality studies, the embodiment of a small virtual hand or a 
child-like avatar changes visual perception in a similar manner as the small-body illusion 
(Banakou et al., 2013; Linkenauger et al., 2013). Following the logic of sensory realignment 
described above, in these studies the attribution of an initiated movement (“I’m moving my 
hand”) to an observed movement close by (“I see a hand moving, it must be mine”), expands 
the representation of visual space in a similar manner as in the small-body illusion. 
How does this sensory realignment mechanism fit with existing theories on the nature of 
visuospatial perception as described in the introduction? Sensorimotor contingency theories 
emphasize the learned association between action and perception (e.g. Held, 1961; Noë, 
2010). According to these theories, the nature of visual perception is to know how visual input 
Figure 14 The own-body-size effect seen from an allocentric 
perspective (A) and from an egocentric perspective (B). 
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will change with movement, and this knowledge is acquired through lifelong experience. Our 
findings show that the own-body-size effect does not necessarily depend on movement of the 
body, i.e. visuomotor realignment is merely one possible way to rescale visuospatial 
perception, as mentioned above. Furthermore, the own-body-size effect does not require 
extensive learning of sensorimotor contingencies. Since, in the typical experiment, 
participants switch between bodies every few minutes, extensive exposure does not appear 
necessary. Thus, the own-body-size effect cannot be explained by sensorimotor contingency 
theories, however, this does not mean that sensory contingencies do not contribute to 
visuospatial perception at all. The perceived size of objects during the small-body illusion was 
between 126% and 220% of their perceived size during the large-body illusion, whereas 
theoretically 500% would be expected since the large artificial body is five times larger than 
the small artificial body. In other words, the effect of visuotactile realignment does not entirely 
override the learned associations between retinal information (i.e. retinal size and distance 
cues) and size perception, which themselves might depend on sensorimotor contingencies.  
Efferent readiness theories fit better with the own-body-size effect. Swapping to a smaller 
body, as in the small-body illusion, changes the action possibilities of the observer. According 
to efferent readiness theories, the perceived size of an object increases because the necessary 
movements to interact with that object change (Gibson, 1979; Grush, 2000; Proffitt, 2006; 
Taylor, 1962). A 400-cm giant might need one hand, or only two fingers, to grasp an object 
whereas an 80-cm dwarf would need two hands. Similarly, the giant would need four steps to 
cover a certain distance, whereas the dwarf needs twenty. Importantly, most efferent 
readiness theories do not require these action possibilities to be learned through experience, 
as is the case for the ecological vision theory (Gibson, 1977, 1979). A giant perceives an object 
as smaller because it affords a different action, without the need of having ever performed 
that specific action to that specific object. In contrast, the energy-cost based perception theory 
(Proffitt, 2006) seems more likely to require some experience with action, in order to know its 
consequences on energy usage. Thus, although we all experienced a small body as a child, 
explaining the perceptual changes in the large body illusion seems more difficult for this 
theory. The theory that suits our interpretation of the own-body-size effect best is the 
disposition theory (or skill theory, (Grush, 2000, 2007)). According to this theory, the 
representation of space is not purely sensory, nor is it purely motoric. It is a higher order 
manifold in which different senses as well as (possible) actions are represented. The nature of 
spatial perception lies in the relation between different senses and motor programs. 
Interestingly, the disposition theory claims that such a representation of space automatically 
causes an observer to have knowledge of being a subjective entity in an objective world, and 
of what constitutes the subjective self and what constitutes objective space (Grush, 2000). This 
idea is closely related to a more functional definition of body-ownership, i.e. to know what 
constitutes oneself and what constitutes the external world, which will be discussed in more 
detail below when interpreting the findings of Study IV. 
What could be the neural mechanisms of the own-body-size effect? Body-ownership relies 
on multisensory integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals. This multisensory 
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integration takes place in multisensory brain areas in the premotor cortex (PMC) and the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS), resulting in a coherent body representation (Ehrsson et al., 2004; 
Lloyd, Shore, Spence, & Calvert, 2002; Petkova, Björnsdotter, et al., 2011). Crucially, the 
subjective experience of ownership correlates with activity in these areas during ownership-
illusions (Petkova, Björnsdotter, et al., 2011). During the small-body illusion and the large-
body illusion, these body representations are updated. Two possible feedback loops might 
convey information about the updated body-representation to affect visuospatial perception. 
First, this information could be fed back to the medial and lateral temporal cortex and the 
medial parietal cortex, which represent external space in egocentric and allocentric 
coordinates (Burgess, Maguire, & O’Keefe, 2002; Galati, Pelle, Berthoz, & Committeri, 2010; 
Kravitz, Saleem, Baker, & Mishkin, 2011; Maguire et al., 1998; Moser, Kropff, & Moser, 
2008). Subsequently, the updated representation of external space would be fed back to visual 
areas in the parietal and occipital cortex that process object size information (Julian, Ryan, & 
Epstein, 2016; Konen & Kastner, 2008; Murray, Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006). In parallel, the 
updated body-representation could directly inform visual areas that process object size 
information. Although this latter possibility would not explain why the entire spatial layout is 
rescaled in the own-body-size effect, it could explain the changed size perception of objects 
when viewed in relative isolation of surrounding visuospatial cues.  
Informing these visual areas about the new body size might result in altered response 
properties of individual neurons. Groups of neurons in the visual cortex that comprise a voxel 
in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are responsive to specific locations of the 
retina, i.e. they have a population receptive field (pRF). It has been shown that such pRFs are 
not fixed, but can be modulated by object size illusions (Murray et al., 2006) and attention (de 
Haas, Schwarzkopf, Anderson, & Rees, 2014). In an unpublished fMRI study, we used 
retinotopic mapping to measure both the size and the eccentricity (i.e. the radial distance 
from fixation) of pRFs for voxels in the visual cortex (V1, V2, V3a, V3b, and V4) during the 
small-body illusion and the large-body illusion. The rationale was that an increased pRF size 
during the small-body illusion would recruit more neurons to represent the same object, and 
therefore make the object appear larger. Similarly, a decrease in pRF eccentricity of single 
voxels in the small-body illusion would also lead to an object being represented by more 
neurons. Following this logic, the opposite pattern was hypothesized for the large-body 
illusion. Albeit a very intriguing hypothesis, our findings were inconclusive for either effect. 
One methodological limitation that might have contributed to this null-finding is the 
relatively narrow field of view of MR-compatible HMDs. This is a problem because they 
offer little space for the visual presentation of an artificial body located in a room in which 
there is a screen that displays the retinotopic mapping stimuli. As a result, and perhaps 
magnified by the need to scan the whole brain in order to confirm activity in multisensory 
brain regions associated with ownership, pRF estimations were only reliable in V1, V2, and 
V3b. It is very possible that perceptual changes are not reflected by activity in these early 
visual areas but instead depend on activity in higher visual areas. 
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The own-body-size effect shows some striking similarities with the Alice in Wonderland 
syndrome (AIWS) (Todd, 1955). And hence, the brain areas associated with this perceptual 
disorder might be suggestive of the underlying brain mechanisms of the own-body-size effect. 
AIWS is characterized by misperceptions of body-space and visual space, although specific 
symptoms vary between patients. Similar to Alice in the famous eponymous novel, typical 
AIWS patients perceive their body (or body-parts) to be much larger or smaller than usual 
(macrosomatognosia and microsomatognosia). In addition, objects may appear much smaller 
or larger than they actually are (micropsia and macropsia), or they may appear much nearer 
or further (telopsia and pelopsia). Macrosomatognosia and microsomatognosia can be 
interpreted as misrepresentations of body-space, whereas micropsia, macropsia, telopsia, and 
pelopsia can be viewed as misrepresentations of visual-space. These symptoms can co-occur 
in a pattern that follows the logic of the own-body-size effect, but may also appear in isolation. 
The most common causes of AIWS are migraine, Epstein-Barr virus infections, and strokes 
(Mastria, Mancini, Viganò, & Di Piero, 2016). Interestingly, AIWS is associated with 
disturbances in parietal areas, including the IPS, which relate to the distortions of body-space, 
and disturbances in occipital areas that relate to the visual distortions of object size and 
distance. For this reason, it has been proposed that AIWS reflects the impaired integration of 
visual and somatosensory information (Mastria et al., 2016), which could be based on specific 
disturbances around the parietal-occipital junction where body-space seems to interact with 
visual space (Chen, Weidner, Weiss, Marshall, & Fink, 2012).  
The own-body-size effect might also play an important role in the retrieval of 
autobiographical memory. In the introduction, I described a phenomenon that most people 
have experienced themselves: the surprise at how small the house that you grew up in appears 
when you revisit it as an adult. Given that our body scales the perceived size of our 
environment, this is not hard to explain. During the encoding of that childhood memory your 
body was small, and therefore your room appeared spacious, but now, standing in your old 
room again, it does not appear that big anymore. You remembered your room to be larger. Just 
as the spatial content of our current visual perception, the spatial content of our 
autobiographical memories is represented relative to our body-size. In other words, 
autobiographical memories seem to be encoded in a certain body-context, i.e. the spatial 
relation between the size of your body and the physical size of the world around you. As your 
body grows, this body-context changes accordingly. Therefore, similar to other well-known 
context-dependency effects on memory (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Nyberg, Habib, 
McIntosh, & Tulving, 2000; Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 
2000), the congruence between the body-context during encoding and retrieval might 
facilitate memory retrieval. This could explain childhood amnesia, i.e. the difficulty of 
remembering childhood memories as an adult (Howe & Courage, 1993; Morrison & 
Conway, 2010; Rubin, 1982), since our current body-context is incongruent with that of our 
childhood. In an ongoing study, we are testing this specific hypothesis by using the small-body 
illusion (van der Hoort et al., 2011; and Study I) to facilitate the retrieval of childhood 
memories. Comparing the small-body illusion with the traditional full-body illusion (Petkova 
& Ehrsson, 2008), the initial results indeed reveal such a body-context effect on 
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autobiographical memory retrieval. To be specific, in the small-body-illusion, participants 
retrieve childhood memories from a younger age, and memories from the same age are 
recalled more vividly, i.e. they have a greater episodic quality (Bergouignan, van der Hoort, & 
Ehrsson, 2013). Importantly, these effects disappear when ownership of the small body is 
disrupted by asynchronous visuotactile stimulation. Given these initial results, the small-body 
illusion might be applicable in clinical psychology, especially for mood and anxiety disorders 
that have been caused by childhood trauma (Heim & Nemeroff, 2001). 
 
5.2 BODY-OWNERSHIP AND VISUAL AWARENESS 
In Study III we combined the classical rubber hand illusion with binocular rivalry to show 
that ownership of a hand promotes visual awareness of that hand. The conclusion that the 
increase in overall dominance of the hand image was truly the consequence of ownership is 
based on several converging results.  
First, the overall dominance increase in the presence of ownership was driven both by 
increased dominance durations as well as by decreased suppression durations. Decreased 
suppression durations are specifically associated with increased stimulus strength, similar to 
the effect of increased contrast (Levelt, 1965), spatial frequency (Fahle, 1982), and luminance 
(O’Shea et al., 1994). Importantly, suppression durations cannot be explained by voluntary 
top down attention (Ooi & He, 1999). Another reason why top down attention could not 
have mediated the effect of ownership is that this would result in a higher switch rate (Ooi & 
He, 1999), however, we found similar perceptual switch rates for conditions with identical 
visual stimuli but different levels of ownership. 
The second finding that is in line with our conclusion is the correlation between overall 
dominance increase and strength of the ownership illusion. Participants that reported the 
strongest sensation of ownership also had the greatest dominance increase of the hand image. 
It seems unlikely that participants felt more ownership because they saw the hand more often, 
for two reasons. First, the correlations were performed on the increased overall dominance, 
not on the absolute time they saw the hand. And second, the subjective report was carried out 
after a 120-s trial, which, even if participants saw the hand merely 25% of the time, should be 
enough to induce ownership. Importantly, participants reported their subjective experience of 
ownership only after all binocular rivalry data was collected, i.e. participants were naïve to the 
concept of body-ownership illusions during the main experiment, and the rivalry data can 
therefore not have been influenced by a response bias. 
The third source of evidence comes from our analysis of the effect of single touches 
(visuotactile events) on the overall dominance of the hand image. Although single visuotactile 
events increased the overall dominance of the hand, the effect of ownership (statistically 
defined as the interaction term in the 2x2 factorial designs of both experiments) was greatest 
before the onset of such an event. This suggests that the effect of single touches, and that of 
their unisensory components, was fixed to the touch-onset and transient in nature. In 
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contrast, ownership itself had a continuous effect, independent of single touches, that was 
relatively larger before the onset of touch.  
Finally, the very effect of single visuotactile events on suppression was modulated by 
ownership. Only when ownership was present did a single touch rescue the hand from 
suppression. This is indicative of two fascinating phenomena. It shows that multisensory 
integration has occurred between the suppressed visual stimulus and the consciously 
perceived tactile event. And it also shows that ownership of the hand is maintained during 
suppression. This finding encouraged us to pursue the unconscious hand-ownership illusion, 
as discussed below. In contrast to suppression durations, the effect of visuotactile events on 
dominance durations was independent of ownership. This does not mean that ownership had 
no effect on dominance durations – it did – but instead, that ownership and single visuotactile 
events contributed independently. 
Taken together, these four results converge to the conclusion that ownership itself 
promotes visual awareness. The temporal characteristics of our findings are in line with the 
idea that ownership effectively increases the stimulus strength of the hand image. 
Alternatively, one might argue that instead of reflecting an increased stimulus strength, the 
effect of body-ownership should be interpreted as a contextual effect. The visual context of 
two rivaling stimuli increases the overall dominance of the stimulus that is congruent with that 
context (Sobel & Blake, 2002). In Study III, the effect in the visual-only condition is an 
example of such an effect. The tactile probe, which was continuously visible because it was 
present in both eyes, served as a visual context that boosts the dominance of the hand image 
in the visual-only condition. This shows that the tactile probe contextualized better with the 
hand image than with the mask, especially when the tactile probe was moving. Similarly, one 
might argue, tactile sensations provide a more potent (cross-modal) context for the hand in 
case ownership of that hand is experienced. However, congruent contexts lengthen 
dominance durations but leave suppression durations relatively unaffected (Sobel & Blake, 
2002). Thus, based on the decreased suppression durations found in Study III, the effect of 
ownership is best explained as resulting in an increased stimulus strength of the hand image, 
rather than providing a better multisensory context for that hand image. 
The effect of ownership on visual awareness should be differentiated from simple cross-
modal interactions on binocular rivalry as described in the introduction. When the sound of a 
birdsong increases the visibility of a bird image (Chen et al., 2011), it seems unlikely that one 
singing bird is perceived. Similarly, when the smell of a rose increases the visibility of a rose 
image (Zhou et al., 2010), do participants really perceive the odor to originate from the 
image? Such effects could be explained by simple facilitating associations between different 
senses. This would be analogue to an effect in the tactile-only condition of Experiment 1 in 
Study III, i.e. if simply being touched on the hand would increase visual awareness of hand 
images in general (we did not find such an effect). In contrast, the effect of ownership could be 
described as an example of multisensory awareness (Deroy et al., 2016), in which the 
multisensory integration of vision, touch, and proprioception leads to the unitary percept of 
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“my hand”, which subsequently increases the signal intensity of visual information from that 
hand. However, as Experiment 2 in Study IV shows, ownership of a hand does not 
necessarily need to be consciously perceived for it to promote visual awareness of that hand. 
Thus, instead of claiming the necessity for multisensory awareness for the effect of body-
ownership shown in Study III, the minimal requirement seems to be the unitary 
representation of the body, based on multisensory integration, be it accompanied by a 
conscious experience of it or not.  
The claim that body-ownership can occur outside the realm of awareness is based on the 
results of Experiment 1a in Study IV. In this experiment, the proprioceptively perceived 
location of participants’ veridical hand shifted towards the location of the suppressed hand 
image. In addition, participants displayed an autonomous fear response to a knife threat in 
the location of the suppressed hand. These implicit measures are standard ways to quantify 
body-ownership (e.g. Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; van der Hoort et 
al., 2011). However, the standard definition of body-ownership refers to it as the subjective 
experience of owning a body (Gallagher, 2000). Thus, to state that body-ownership can occur 
outside of awareness requires an alternative, more functional definition: Ownership is the 
ability of an organism to dissociate between body-space and external space, i.e. to have 
knowledge of the boundaries of the body in spatial coordinates, which in itself does not 
depend on a conscious experience. Such ‘functional ownership’ does not necessarily require 
different underlying mechanisms. As described in the introduction, the representation of the 
body is thought to arise from multisensory integration of vision, touch, and proprioception 
(Ehrsson, 2012). And although multisensory integration is typically investigated during 
perceptual awareness of those senses, awareness itself might not be necessary. In fact, there is 
no reason why ownership could not be induced when both visual stimulation and tactile 
stimulation are masked (D’Amour & Harris, 2014), since multisensory integration can occur 
in complete unawareness (Faivre et al., 2014).  
The unconscious ownership illusion is in line with the anatomical rule and the perspective 
rule of ownership, which reflect the integration of the masked hand with proprioceptive 
information. However, the results of Study IV cannot conclude that unconscious ownership, 
albeit induced by synchronous visuotactile stimulation, follows the spatial rule and the 
temporal rule to a similar degree as the conscious rubber hand illusion. For example, is the 
temporal resolution of unconscious visual processes high enough to dissociate between 
synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile stimulation? Similarly, is it necessary for the 
masked visual touch and the felt touch to occur on corresponding fingers, i.e. does 
unconscious ownership follow the spatial rule of multisensory integration? Future studies 
should aim to answer these open questions. 
Another consideration of the unconscious ownership illusion concerns the assessment of 
visual awareness. Participants were instructed to report the orientation of the hand as soon as 
they could, and analyses were only performed on trials in which participants did not respond. 
Could participants have seen small parts of the masked stimulus, without being able to detect 
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the orientation of the hand? If participants had seen the moving object, they must have seen 
patches of skin as well, because the moving object was black and therefore only visible by 
contrast of the hand (which itself was on a black background). Furthermore, if participants 
were aware of small patches of skin, following the moving object, they would effectively have 
seen the hand in a searchlight manner. Touches were applied from the back of the hand to 
the tip of the index-finger. Given that the moving object was wider than a finger but not 
wider than the back of the hand, the index-finger should be dissociable from the back of the 
hand in such searchlight-like visual awareness, and therefore hand orientation should be 
detectable. Thus, the specific design of the visual stimuli makes it unlikely that orientation of 
the hand would not be detected if local breaks through suppression had occurred. In addition, 
such local breaks through suppression would not explain why the orientation of the masked 
hand influenced proprioceptive drift and SCRs. And finally, local breaks through 
suppression, in the absence of hand orientation detection, would not explain why a congruent 
hand breaks through suppression faster (Experiment 2). Taken together, it seems unlikely that 
local breaks through suppression that may have occurred in Study IV could explain our 
results. Nevertheless, in follow-up investigations of the temporal rule and spatial rule of 
unconscious ownership, it would be a good idea to assess these local breaks through 
suppression more directly, perhaps by having participants report movement instead of hand 
orientation. 
Taken together, the results of Study III and Study IV reveal an intriguing interplay 
between ownership and visual awareness. On the one hand, ownership promotes visual 
awareness, but on the other hand, visual awareness is not necessary for ownership. What 
could be the neural mechanisms of these findings? Let us first consider the effect of hand-
ownership on visual awareness of that hand. Conscious hand-ownership results from 
multisensory integration in IPS and PMC (Ehrsson, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Gentile et al., 
2013; Petkova, Björnsdotter, et al., 2011), whereas the visual perception of hands is associated 
with activity in the extrastriate body area (EBA) (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 
2001), which is a functionally defined area in the lateral occipital complex (LOC). The EBA is 
also able to dissociate between one’s own hand and someone else’s hand (Downing et al., 
2001; Myers & Sowden, 2008). Interestingly, during the rubber hand illusion, functional 
connectivity between the IPS and the EBA is increased, indicative of increased 
communication between those areas (Gentile et al., 2013; Guterstam et al., 2013). Therefore, 
it is plausible that feedback from the IPS increases the signal-to-noise ratio of the hand image. 
Since suppressed objects are still processed by the LOC (Fang & He, 2005), this would lead to 
both increased dominance duration and decreased suppression durations. The idea that 
ownership promotes visual awareness through increased feedback from the IPS to the EBA 
fits with the recurrent processing theory of consciousness (Lamme, 2006; Lamme & Roelfsema, 
2000). According to this theory, the initial feedforward current of visual information from 
early visual areas to higher visual areas, and from the visual cortex to nonvisual brain areas, is 
not sufficient to induce visual awareness. Only when information is fed back to (early) visual 
areas through recurrent processing does awareness of the visual stimulus arise (Lamme, 2006; 
Lamme & Roelfsema, 2000; van Loon, Scholte, van Gaal, van der Hoort, & Lamme, 2012). 
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In line with this theory of visual awareness, recurrent processing from the IPS to the EBA 
would cause awareness of the hand-image. 
How then is ownership induced in the absence of visual awareness? Somehow, the 
suppressed visual stimulus needs to arrive in the IPS in order to be integrated with tactile and 
proprioceptive information. The minimal visual information that is required to survive during 
suppression is the shape and orientation of the hand, and the movement of the tactile probe. 
The shape and orientation of the suppressed hand is processed by the brain (Salomon et al., 
2013), probably in the EBA, since objects are still processed in the LOC during suppression 
(Fang & He, 2005). Subsequently, this information could travel towards the IPS along the 
dorsal stream, as has been shown for tools (Fang & He, 2005). Motion information is also 
processed during suppression (Itoh et al., 2005; Kaunitz et al., 2011; Koivisto et al., 2010; 
Maruya et al., 2008), and this information might reach motion-sensitive areas in the IPS 
(Shulman et al., 1999). Thus, the required visual information would reach the IPS and be 
integrated with tactile and proprioceptive information to induce unconscious ownership. The 
effect of such unconscious hand-ownership on visual awareness of the hand, as shown in 
Experiment 2 of Study IV, are thought to use identical mechanisms as described for the effect 
of conscious ownership.  
Despite the fact that both conscious ownership and unconscious ownership might rely on 
multisensory integration in the IPS, they are phenomenologically very different. This 
phenomenological difference might be due to a combination of two factors. First, conscious 
ownership might simply be due to stronger activity in the IPS. And second, additional brain 
areas could be needed for ownership to reach awareness. For example, areas in the premotor 
cortex that have been associated with body-ownership (Ehrsson et al., 2005, 2004) might be 
necessary to become fully aware of it, and perhaps in combination with prefrontal areas, 
could enable the participant to report on those experiences (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, 
Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). 
 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS  
The main aim of this thesis was to assess the effect of body-ownership on visual 
perception. Body-ownership plays an important role in visuospatial perception, by inversely 
scaling the perceived size of the world to the size of the own body. This recalibration reflects a 
link between body-space and visual space that depends on the alignment of somatosensory 
information and visual information. Body-ownership was also shown to promote visual 
awareness, by increasing the stimulus-strength of visual information from the body. In 
addition to these effects of ownership on visual perception, we established a novel paradigm 
in which ownership is induced for a hand that is not consciously perceived because it is 
suppressed by a mask. This unconscious rubber hand illusion relies on visuo-tactile-
proprioceptive integration in the absence of visual awareness. These findings contribute to the 
understanding of the nature and mechanisms of both visual perception and body-ownership.  
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